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INTRODUCTION 
The prevalence of “concealment warfare” and “human shields” 
makes armed conflicts different today from ever before.1  Yet, debate 
about the legal and moral justifications for states’ targeting decisions 
in such conflicts frequently remains rooted in laws and norms that 
were not designed to address these modern tactics.2  Comparisons 
between international and domestic law often illustrate how current 
international law may not align with popular conceptions of justice.3   
Consider Professor Alan Dershowitz’s editorial about the 2006 
conflict between Hezbollah and Israel.4  Dershowitz observes that in 
the United States, “[a] bank robber who takes a teller hostage and 
fires at police from behind his human shield is guilty of murder if 
[the police], in an effort to stop the robber from shooting, 
accidentally kill the hostage.”5  Dershowitz then compares Hezbollah 
                                                          
 1. See, e.g., EDMUND CAIRNS, A SAFER FUTURE:  REDUCING THE HUMAN COST OF WAR 
5–6 (1997) (arguing that while modern wars involve new actors and complex 
relationships between parties, policy-makers must not lose sight of their goal of 
creating a world where change can be pursued “without a resort to major armed 
conflict”); see also id. (observing that modern conflicts often include the participation 
of states, guerilla forces, organized crime groups, and even businesses); Gregory M. 
Travalio, Terrorism, International Law, and the Use of Military Force, 18 WIS. INT’L L.J. 
145, 150–51, 183–84 (2000) (noting the legal challenges presented by states’ varying 
degrees of involvement with terrorist organizations). 
 2. Cf. Abraham D. Sofaer, The Sixth Annual Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in 
International Law:  Terrorism, the Law, and the National Defense, 126 MIL. L. REV. 89, 90 
(1989) (“Many proposed military actions were considered and rejected during recent 
years on legal grounds . . . . But the law must not be allowed improperly to interfere 
with legitimate national security measures.”). 
 3. See infra Part II (suggesting that the domestic legal treatment of certain bank 
robber and haystack fire scenarios should influence the international legal response 
to the use of human shields).  The word “justice” has many different meanings.  It is 
used in this paper to refer to the concept of fairness and impartiality towards all 
parties affected by a given incident.  For an overview of different ways that the 
concept of “justice” is applied, see The Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/contents.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2007).  
 4. Alan M. Dershowitz, Arithmetic of Pain, WALL ST. J., July 19, 2006, at A12. 
 5. Id.  Although the exact type of criminal liability (i.e., first degree murder, 
second degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, or involuntary manslaughter) varies 
based on jurisdiction and statutory interpretation, this basic principle is reflected in 
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militants who fired at civilian targets from areas populated by other 
civilians to the hypothetical bank robber.6  The international actor 
who hides behind human shields, like the robber, creates a situation 
that imperils innocent lives.7  And the robber, like the actor who uses 
human shields, forces the police to weigh the value of one set of 
innocent lives against their goals of protecting other innocent lives 
and preserving order.8  Further, the police officer, like a responding 
military, is forced to make a hurried and likely imprecise judgment 
about what damages may result from taking action to stop the 
criminal.9 
International law is not silent on what responses are justified when 
a state is attacked by an opponent who launches attacks while hiding 
among civilians.10  Rather, international law offers ambiguous and 
potentially contradictory guidance to states faced with this situation 
by broadly authorizing the use of force in self-defense while also 
declaring such uses of force illegal in certain situations where actors 
utilize human shield tactics.11  Debates among legal scholars, 
                                                          
criminal law throughout the United States.  But see infra note 83 (noting that the 
imposition of criminal liability in such situations is viewed negatively by some because 
it may disregard the actor’s mens rea).  See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 
§§ 7.4–7.5, 7.7 (3d ed. 2000).   
 6. Dershowitz, supra note 4. 
 7. See Emanuel Gross, Use of Civilians as Human Shields:  What Legal and Moral 
Restrictions Pertain to a War Waged by a Democratic State Against Terrorism?, 16 EMORY 
INT’L L. REV. 445, 456 (2002) [hereinafter Gross, Human Shields] (observing that 
when belligerents use human shields, they “expose civilians to the ramifications of 
the conflict,” and that “[h]owever extensive the efforts on the part of the state, they 
cannot . . . confin[e] the injury solely to the terrorist”). 
 8. See Dershowitz, supra note 4 (contending that “[a] democracy is entitled to 
prefer the lives of its own innocents over the lives of the civilians of an aggressor, 
especially if the latter group contains many who are complicit in terrorism”). 
 9. See, e.g., Jefferson D. Reynolds, Collateral Damage on the 21st Century Battlefield:  
Enemy Exploitation of the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Struggle for a Moral High Ground, 
56 A.F. L. REV. 1, 19–22 (2005) (stating that the use of human shields by the Vietcong 
army caused the United States to refrain from attacking certain military outposts, 
which then led to a U.S. military disadvantage); infra text accompanying notes 41–45 
(discussing the civilian and Israeli military deaths that resulted when the Israeli 
Defense Force was forced to respond to the human shield tactics employed by 
Palestinian militants). 
 10. See Emanuel Gross, The Laws of War Waged Between Democratic States and 
Terrorist Organizations:  Real or Illusive?, 15 FLA. J. INT’L L. 389, 408 (2003) (identifying 
the Hague Conventions, Geneva Conventions, and Protocols Additional to the 
Fourth Geneva Convention as prominent sources of international law regarding 
civilian casualties). 
 11. Compare Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 
I) art. 51, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I] (“1.  The civilian 
population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against dangers 
arising from military operations. . . . 2.  The civilian population as such, as well as 
individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack.”), with U.N. Charter art. 51 
(“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
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statesmen, and the press often focus on which set of rules should 
apply in a given scenario, but this framework assumes that current 
international law is adequate to produce just results in the face of 
human shield tactics.12  Given the lack of consensus on an 
appropriate legal framework for dealing with new strategies (both 
within and between states),13 this Comment posits that the existing 
framework is inadequate. 
Addressing the just war principles that motivate international law is 
an important step in developing new rules.14  Documents such as the 
Hague Conventions,15 the Geneva Conventions,16 and the U.N. 
                                                          
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security.”).  Of course, nations conducting defensive attacks 
would not characterize their attacks as ones on civilians.  However, human shield 
tactics blur the line between a military and civilian target and allow human shield 
users to claim that a given defensive action is an illegal attack on a civilian object.  See 
infra note 114 (explaining how the provisions of Protocol I work in conjunction to 
make attacks on actors using human shields in civilian areas illegal in most 
situations).   
 12. See, e.g., Leah M. Campbell, Comment, Defending Against Terrorism:  A Legal 
Analysis of the Decision to Strike Sudan and Afghanistan, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1067, 1071–72, 
1074, 1094–95 (2000) (working exclusively within the framework of current laws of 
armed conflict despite admitting their shortcomings); Kenneth Anderson et al., A 
Public Call for International Attention to Legal Obligations of Defending Forces as Well as 
Attacking Forces To Protect Civilians in Armed Conflict, CRIMES OF WAR PROJECT, Mar. 19, 
2003, http://www.crimesofwar.org/special/Iraq/news-iraq3.html (questioning 
whether certain contemporary interpretations of the laws of war concerning human 
shields undermine the laws’ original purpose).   
 13. Compare Erin Guruli, The Terrorism Era:  Should the International Community 
Redefine its Legal Standards on Use of Force in Self-Defense?, 12 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & 
DISP. RESOL. 100, 123 (2004) (noting that as warfare continues to change, 
international law becomes less influential and should be altered), and Gabriel 
Swiney, Saving Lives:  The Principle of Distinction and the Realities of Modern Warfare, 39 
INT’L LAW. 733, 733–34 (2005) (contending that even the long-standing Principle of 
Distinction must be supplemented in order to create just laws of armed conflict), 
with J. Nicholas Kendall, Israel Counter-Terrorism:  “Targeted Killings” Under International 
Law, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1069, 1069–70 (2003) (arguing completely within the framework 
of current international law that Israel’s practice of “targeted killings” is legal). 
 14. See JAMES TURNER JOHNSON, MORALITY & CONTEMPORARY WARFARE 23 (1999) 
[hereinafter JOHNSON, MORALITY] (noting that just war theory has “[d]eveloped over 
history as a result of contributions from both secular and religious sources, reflecting 
the practice of statecraft and war as well as moral and political theory”).  However, 
the current debate over how to interpret and apply international law is dominated by 
considerations of states’ interests.  See Emanuel Gross, Thwarting Terrorist Acts by 
Attacking the Perpetrators or Their Commanders as an Act of Self-Defense:  Human Rights 
Versus the State’s Duty to Protect its Citizens, 15 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 195, 202–05 
(2001) [hereinafter Gross, Thwarting Terrorist Acts] (discussing how state-specific 
interests in combating terrorism motivated Israel, the United States, and Britain not 
to sign Protocol I). 
 15. First Peace Conference at The Hague. July 29, 1899, T.S. No. 392; Second 
Peace Conference at The Hague, Oct. 18, 1907, T.S. No. 536. 
 16. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
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Charter17 reflect moral principles upon which there is a general 
consensus.18  These principles can then form the basis for a consensus 
about what responses are justified when a state is attacked by fighters 
who use civilians as shields.19  In other words, this Comment answers 
the question of what should be legal, by first addressing what is just.20  
“The horrible events and actions confronted in war must be 
divided between those evil in all respects and those that can be set 
into a relationship of priorities along with other relative evils.”21  This 
Comment argues that international law regarding concealment 
warfare must preserve a strong right of self-defense against parties 
who use such tactics, despite the potential for some incidental 
damage.22  The proposals herein attempt to strike a balance, however, 
between this necessity for self-defense and the various broadly 
accepted humanitarian concerns.23  
Part I examines the new strategies being used in armed conflict, 
the moral and legal dilemmas posed by these strategies, and state 
responses to them, concluding that international law has not kept 
pace with the realities of modern armed conflicts.24  Part II advances 
analogies between domestic criminal and tort law and international 
                                                          
 17. U.N. Charter. 
 18. See JOHNSON, MORALITY, supra note 14, at 28–30 tbls.3 & 4, 197–98 (outlining 
the moral principles justifying the resort to war and their reflection in international 
humanitarian law). 
 19. See infra note 155 and accompanying text (noting that the just war tradition is 
based upon actual problems encountered during war over the course of history and, 
as such, serves as a useful basis for certain international legal standards). 
 20. See JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS:  A RESTATEMENT 3 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001) 
(positing that one of the principle roles of political philosophy is to “identify 
reasonable and rational ends” and to show how “those ends can cohere within a well-
articulated conception of a just and reasonable society”). 
 21. JOHNSON, MORALITY, supra note 14, at 18. 
 22. For definitions of “jus in bello” and “jus ad bellum,” see infra note 26.  Though 
the right to engage in self-defense is a jus ad bellum concept, that right necessarily 
must be preserved through prudent interpretation of jus in bello concepts.  An 
excessively restrictive application of jus in bello principles severely impedes upon 
states’ ability to exercise the right to self-defense.  See infra notes 131–32 and 
accompanying text (indicating that self-defense correlates with jus ad bellum 
principles because, as a doctrine, it purports to justify the use of force in a given 
scenario); cf. Michael Y. Kieval, Note, Be Reasonable!  Thoughts on the Effectiveness of 
State Criticism in Enforcing International Law, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 869, 887–90 (2005) 
(suggesting that expecting strict adherence to international law is unfairly restrictive 
in the face of a threat and that a country can respect the goals of international law 
without adhering to its prescriptions in all situations). 
 23. See MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS:  A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH 
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 22 (1977) [hereinafter WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS] 
(recognizing that the “moral reality of war” is “relatively stable” because it reflects a 
shared “understanding of states and soldiers, the protagonists of war, and of combat, 
[war’s] central experience”). 
 24. See CAIRNS, supra note 1, at 5–6 (arguing that despite the involvement of 
actors that blur the line between government, businesses and organized crime, 
policy-makers should still aim to “make conflict peaceful”). 
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law regarding human shield situations, with the goal of finding legal 
“tools” that can be adapted for use in the international forum.25  Part 
III discusses just war theory in general, lays out specific concepts 
associated with jus in bello principles,26 and explores how just war 
concepts are reflected in international law.27  Part IV proposes new 
international laws regarding acceptable military responses to “human 
shield” tactics.28  Part IV also discusses the benefits of the new laws, 
concluding that there can and should be a consensus that the 
proposed laws are justified.29 
I. MODERN CONFLICTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW’S SHORTCOMINGS 
A. Modern Conflicts Involve Tactics that Make Non-Combatant 
Discrimination Difficult 
The tactics used in modern conflicts have altered the consequences 
of war and increased civilian casualties.30  The rising rate of civilian 
deaths can be attributed to some factors that are not the focus of this 
paper,31 but they can also be attributed to the increased use of illegal 
and perfidious tactics by some state and non-state actors, such as the 
use of civilians as human shields.32  Of course, not all combatants who 
                                                          
 25. See Dershowitz, supra note 4 (lamenting the absence of widespread 
condemnation for fighters who fight from and take shelter within a civilian 
population, and suggesting that U.S. domestic law serve as an international standard 
under which these fighters are held criminally liable for their actions). 
 26. “Jus in bello” refers to “right conduct in the midst of battle,” and translates as 
“justice in war.”  STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA ON PHILOSOPHY War (Edward N. Zalta ed., 
2005),http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/war/ [hereinafter STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
War].  “Jus ad bellum” are principles that govern “[w]hat constitutes a just or unjust 
resort to armed force.”  Id. 
 27. See JOHNSON, MORALITY, supra note 14, at 28–30 tbls.3 & 4 (indicating that the 
“classical statements” of jus in bello principles include lists of people immune from 
attack, “Geneva Law,” and limitations on the weapons used in fighting). 
 28. See infra Part IV.A. 
 29. See infra Parts IV.B–E. 
 30. In World War I, civilians accounted for an estimated fifteen percent of 
deaths; in World War II, civilians made up an estimated sixty-five percent of deaths; 
and in conflicts today, the number is estimated above eighty-four percent.  CAIRNS, 
supra note 1, at 17. 
 31. See Claude Bruderlein, The End of Innocence:  Humanitarian Protection in the 
Twenty-First Century, in INT’L PEACE ACAD., CIVILIANS IN WAR 221, 222 (Simon 
Chesterman ed., 2001) (attributing increased danger to civilians in part to the 
proliferation of small arms and land mines); see also Swiney, supra note 13, at 750–52 
(arguing that the increased presence of “dual-use targets” that serve both civilian and 
military goals has made it more difficult for actors to distinguish between 
appropriate and inappropriate targets). 
 32. The rise of “concealment warfare” and the use of human shields are widely 
regarded to have begun during the Vietnam War.  Reynolds, supra note 9, at 4, 17, 
19–20.  For a definition of “perfidy,” see Protocol I, supra note 11, art. 37, which 
states: 
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resort to concealment warfare have the same objectives, use the same 
methods, and present the exact same issues of distinction in armed 
conflicts.33  This Comment focuses specifically on belligerents who fail 
to keep their military personnel and equipment separate from 
civilians, reject the idea of noncombatant immunity, and/or exploit 
the principle of civilian immunity by baiting opposing forces into 
attacks of ambiguous legality.34  A few examples of these tactics are 
demonstrative of the need for greater clarity in international law. 
When the Allied forces of the United States and the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization attempted to end Slobodan Milosevic’s ethnic 
cleansing campaign in Yugoslavia, Serbian forces employed several 
deceptive and illegal tactics.35  Serbian troops hid in civilian 
structures, walked among civilians, and placed military equipment 
near civilians.36  In their attempts to defeat the Serbian military, the 
Allied forces were, in effect, forced to choose between allowing the 
Serbian atrocities to continue and stopping the atrocities at the 
                                                          
1.  It is prohibited to kill, injure or capture an adversary by resort to perfidy.  
Acts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is 
entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of 
international law applicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray that 
confidence, shall constitute perfidy. The following acts are examples of 
perfidy:  (a) The feigning of an intent to negotiate under a flag of truce or of 
a surrender; (b) The feigning of an incapacitation by wounds or sickness;  
(c) The feigning of civilian, non-combatant status; and (d) The feigning of 
protected status by the use of signs, emblems or uniforms of the United 
Nations or of neutral or other States not Parties to the conflict. 
The definition of “human shields” is not totally consistent among States and 
Intergovernmental organizations, but the Statute of the International Criminal Court 
says the war crime of using human shields encompasses “utilizing the presence of a 
civilian or other protected person to render certain points, areas, or military forces 
immune from military operations.”  Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, art. 8, para. 2, (b)(xxiii).  It is unclear whether this definition amounts to 
perfidy under Protocol I, but given the harm this tactic presents to civilians who rely 
on their surroundings being immune from attack, there is a strong argument that 
such tactics are “perfidious.”  See Louis Rene Beres, Israel, Lebanon, and Hizbullah:  A 
Jurisprudential Assessment, 14 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 141, 146-49 (1997) (arguing that 
using human shields falls within the definition of perfidy under various provisions of 
international law).         
 33. See Bruce D. Jones & Charles K. Cater, From Chaos to Coherence?  Toward a 
Regime for Protecting Civilians in War, in INT’L PEACE ACAD., supra note 31, at 239 
(noting that the specific objectives of a belligerent non-state actor can make that 
actor more or less prone to respecting noncombatant immunity).  If a group is 
seeking political inclusion, then that group will often be more responsive to 
humanitarian concerns.  Id.  Many non-state belligerents engage in political activities 
and provide social services.  Id.  Conversely, a group seeking secession would be more 
prone to attacking civilians.  Id. 
 34. See generally Reynolds, supra note 9, at 2–3 (expressing concern over the 
growing number of incidents where adversaries use the laws of armed conflict to gain 
a “strategic advantage,” rather than as a means for ensuring a more just war). 
 35. Reynolds, supra note 9, at 35–40. 
 36. Id. at 36–37 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, REPORT TO CONGRESS:  
KOSOVO/OPERATION ALLIED FORCE AFTER-ACTION REPORT 60–63 (2000)). 
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expense of civilian lives.37  Amazingly, though, when some members 
of the international community debated the conflict, scrutiny focused 
on the Allied forces’ targeting decisions.38  This is not to say that 
Allied forces did not make mistakes or violate international law—they 
may have.39  Rather, this incident illustrates that current 
interpretations of international law by some members of the 
international community scrutinize the actor forced to make that 
difficult decision just as much as (if not more than) the actor who 
created the scenario by actions that were, in themselves, violations of 
international law.40   
Another example of the consequences of human shield tactics is 
the action of the Israel Defense Forces (“IDF”) in the Jenin refugee 
camp on the West Bank.41  Israel had credible and correct intelligence 
that the Jenin camp was serving as a base for militants who had killed 
Israeli civilians in suicide bombings in March of 2003.42  Aware of 
civilians’ presence, the IDF performed a ground operation (as 
opposed to bombing) designed to prevent further attacks on Israeli 
citizens.43  During the ensuing conflict, Palestinian fighters booby-
trapped civilian homes and fired at Israeli forces while standing 
                                                          
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 38 (citing HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CIVILIAN DEATHS IN THE NATO AIR 
CAMPAIGN (2000), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/nato/Natbm200-01.htm#P21 
7_53015). 
 39. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE CRISIS IN KOSOVO:  CASE STUDIES OF CIVILIAN 
DEATHS (2000), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/nato/Natbm200-01.htm#P295_7 
9629 (decrying the use of cluster bombs near civilians because their effects are not 
easily controlled). 
 40. See Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, The Applicable Law, ¶ 549 
(Jan. 14, 2000), available at http://www.un.org/icty/kupreskic/trialc2/judgement/ 
index.htm  (“[T]he presence of those actively involved in the conflict should not 
prevent the characterization of a population as civilian and those actively involved in 
a resistance movement can qualify as victims of crimes against humanity.”).  Note 
also that attempted genocide and use of human shields, both of which the Serbian 
forces were accused, are violations of international law.  See Protocol I, supra note 11, 
art. 58 (requiring parties to keep separate military facilities and civilian populations); 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 
1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (declaring genocide as a crime under 
international law). 
 41. See generally Gross, Human Shields, supra note 7, at 499–502, and Kieval, 
supra note 22, at 889–892, for discussions about the IDF/Palestinian conflict. 
 42. See Gross, Human Shields, supra note 7, at 499–500 (quoting an internal Fatah 
report, which expressed pride in the Jenin camp having achieved recognition as a 
“hornet’s nest” and as “the capital of the suicides”). 
 43. See id. at 500 (noting that the IDF also issued a warning for residents to leave 
their homes upon their arrival in Jenin); see also Kieval, supra note 22, at 890–91 
(comparing Israel’s choice to invade the camp on the ground with Russia’s choice to 
attack Grozny from the air, and approving of Israel’s attempt to fight as 
discriminately as possible, given the situation). 
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behind innocent civilians.44  In its attempt to use the least destructive 
means necessary to capture those responsible for previous attacks, the 
IDF suffered many casualties that an air attack could have avoided.45  
But when the dust settled, only the Israeli forces were on trial—
accused of committing a “massacre.”46 
There is no shortage of additional examples of tactics that led to 
the exploitation of civilian populations and the misuse of 
international law to sway public opinion.  Plain-clothed women have 
been used to lure soldiers into a firefight with insurgents,47 civilians 
have been placed on top of bunkers that housed military leaders,48 
and false cries for help have been made in order to set soldiers up for 
ambushes.49 
B. Current International Law Can Give Advantages to Actors who Use 
Human Shields 
International law, even when it is not enforced or ratified, is 
important because it influences states’ policies and behavior, as well 
as international perception.50  Public perception can in turn make the 
                                                          
 44. See Gross, Human Shields, supra note 7, at 500–01 (citing HCJ 3114/02 Barake 
v. Minister of Defence [2002] IsrSC 56(3) 11, 14–15); Kieval, supra note 22, at 890 
(observing that the fighters based in Jenin even used a United Nations building as a 
“firing base”). 
 45. Gross, Human Shields, supra note 7, at 501.  This exemplifies Michael Walzer’s 
suggestion that actors in a self-defense action must be willing to accept costs to 
themselves in order to protect civilian lives.  See infra note 174 (explaining that in 
modern times an actor with good intentions can seek to minimize any evil effects of 
its actions by accepting additional costs to itself). 
 46. See Gross, Human Shields, supra note 7, at 501 (noting that numerous petitions 
were made to the Supreme Court of Israel arguing that atrocities had taken place in 
Jenin).  But see Kieval, supra note 22, at 891 (wondering “what more could have been 
done” by Israel to protect civilians given the perfidious tactics used by its opponents). 
 47. See, e.g., Elizabeth Neuffer, City Battles Will Boost Growing Civilian Toll, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Apr. 7, 2003, at A25 (noting twelve civilian deaths as a result of one such 
attack). 
 48. For discussions of the well publicized Al Firdos bunker incident, see W. 
Chadwick Austin & Antony Barone Kolenc, Who’s Afraid of the Big Bad Wolf?  The 
International Criminal Court as a Weapon of Asymmetric Warfare, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. 291, 326 (2006), and Reynolds, supra note 9, at 33–35. 
 49. See Samuel Vincent Jones, Has Conduct in Iraq Confirmed the Moral Inadequacy of 
International Humanitarian Law?  Examining the Confluence Between Contract Theory and 
the Scope of Civilian Immunity During Armed Conflict, 16 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 249, 
250–51 (2006) (relaying the story of how Iraqi insurgents waived white flags and 
pleaded for medical assistance only to detonate a car bomb and ambush the soldiers 
rushing to give assistance). 
 50. See Austin & Kolenc, supra note 48, at 293–94 (noting the rise of “law-fare,” in 
which non-state actors use intimidation and terror to exploit the laws of war for the 
purpose of influencing the policies of states that oppose them).  While Israel and the 
United States have not signed Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 
1949, they still make efforts to comply with its fundamental aims.  See supra notes 43–
45 and accompanying text (observing measures taken by Israel to fight as 
discriminately as they thought was prudently possible in the circumstances); see also 
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legitimate use of force either more or less difficult, regardless of 
whether a given perception is justified.51  In other words, 
international law matters because it serves as the framework for 
academic, legal, and media analyses of the use of military force.52 
Consider the report by Human Rights Watch on Lebanese civilian 
casualties resulting from the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in 
the Summer of 2006.53  Regarding Israel’s alleged failure to follow the 
principles of distinction and proportionality, the report extensively 
cites the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts.54  Yet, the section ironically titled “The Applicable 
Law” never mentions Article 58 of Protocol I, which requires actors to 
remove their targets from civilian populations.55 
This one-sided analysis fails in at least two ways.  First, it fails to 
consider an actor’s culpability for creating a risk of harm to civilians 
by performing military operations⎯such as training soldiers or 
planning attacks⎯in an area populated by civilians.56  This is an 
                                                          
Campbell, supra note 12, at 1074–75 (recognizing that “the law of the United States 
includes international law,” and despite the United Nation’s “frustrating impotence,” 
that body still defines general standards for the use of force in international law). 
 51. See Austin & Kolenc, supra note 48, at 311 (identifying the possibility that 
actors can “exploit” the International Criminal Court by “filing questionable or 
fraudulent complaints for the Court to investigate” and by directing media attention 
to these complaints in order to enhance “international pressure” against the actor 
put on the defensive by the complaints); see also Beres, supra note 32, at 152–53 
(positing that regardless of how it is interpreted by various bodies, international law 
cannot become a “suicide pact” that “preclude[s] essential uses of force”). 
 52. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Israel/Occupied Palestinian Territories, 
http://hrw.org/doc?t=mideast&c=isrlpa (last visited Oct. 9, 2007) (presenting 
several reports, commentaries, and press releases that utilize international law to 
assess the propriety of many different uses of force in the Israel-Palestine conflict); see 
also Jones, supra note 49, at 298 (concluding that international law “leaves itself too 
vulnerable to socio-political influences”). 
 53. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FATAL STRIKES:  ISRAEL’S INDISCRIMINATE ATTACKS IN 
LEBANON (2006), http://hrw.org/reports/2006/lebanon 0806/lebanon0806webw 
cover.pdf. 
 54. Id. at 43–47. 
 55. Id.; see Protocol I, supra note 11, art. 58 (declaring that parties to a conflict 
must avoid operating in densely-populated areas; remove the civilian population 
from the location of an attack; and take any other necessary precautions to protect 
the civilian population from danger).  Despite Israel not being a party to Protocol I, 
“all parties to an armed conflict whether States or non-State actors are bound by 
international humanitarian law.” International Committee of the Red Cross, Who is 
Bound by the Geneva Conventions? (2007), http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteen 
g0.nsf/htm l/5KZJAV.   
 56. See Anderson, supra note 12 (observing that attackers’ obligations under 
Protocol I can be made nearly impossible to fulfill if defending actors violate Article 
57(1), and arguing that because of this, closer attention must be paid to defenders’ 
violations of the laws of war); see also infra notes 96–106 and accompanying text 
(suggesting that international observers must focus on the unlawful conduct of 
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unrealistic view of Protocol I that arguably creates mutually binding, 
yet non-reciprocal obligations.57  Article 57 of Protocol I places an 
affirmative duty on states to take certain precautions before an attack 
in order to avoid civilian casualties.58  Article 51(7) does establish a 
duty for defending actors, declaring that 
[t]he presence or movements of the civilian population or 
individual civilians shall not be used to render certain points or 
areas immune from military operations, in particular in attempts to 
shield military objectives from attacks or to shield, favour or 
impede military operations. The Parties to the conflict shall not 
direct the movement of the civilian population or individual 
civilians in order to attempt to shield military objectives from 
attacks or to shield military operations.59 
However, Article 51(8) adds that a failure by the defending actor to 
abide by the prohibitions of Article 51 does not alter an attacking 
state’s obligations under Article 57.60  In modern warfare, the effect of 
a defending party’s failure to live up to its duties to separate civilian 
and military parties is that an attacking party cannot avoid certain 
civilian casualties that it otherwise would have been able to prevent.61  
Commentators, courts, and NGOs should therefore scrutinize both 
attackers’ and defenders’ conduct; while doing so, they should 
recognize that attackers’ ability to meet their obligations under 
Article 57 depends partially on defenders’ actions.62 
                                                          
militants that places civilian lives in danger, and not just on the conduct of 
responding militaries that cause civilian death).   
 57. See Anderson, supra note 12 (lamenting that NGOs and scholars focus mostly 
on attackers’ violations of Protocol I, despite the obvious ways that attackers’ ability 
to meet their obligations will vary based upon the defending actors’ conduct); 
Symposium:  The Hague Peace Conferences:  The Laws of War on Land, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 42, 
53 (2000) (“I believe that these provisions of Protocol I for the protection of civilians 
have either codified or progressively developed customary international law in a way 
that has now become customary law and, consequently, are binding today upon all 
parties to international armed conflicts, including nonparties to the Protocol.”). 
 58. See Protocol I, supra note 11, art. 57 (declaring that attacking forces “shall . . . 
[t]ake all feasible precautions” so as “to spare the civilian population, civilians and 
civilian objects”). 
 59. Id. art. 51, para. 7. 
 60. See id. art. 51, para. 8 (“Any violation of these prohibitions shall not release 
the Parties to the conflict from their legal obligations with respect to the civilian 
population and civilians, including the obligation to take the precautionary measures 
provided for in Article 57.”). 
 61. See Anderson, supra note 12 (approving of the United States’ policy in Iraq of 
treating the use of human shields to protect military targets as a war crime). 
 62. Id. 
 490 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:479 
Second, the above-mentioned analysis unfairly undermines the 
right to self-defense.63  If military measures calculated to end a 
well-documented threat of rocket fire are prohibited by virtue of 
where the original attacks originate, then the right of self-defense has 
been, in effect, nullified.64  To avoid this result, anyone analyzing such 
a scenario should give due consideration to the attacker’s necessity 
before condemning the attack as violating Article 57 of Protocol I.65 
The examples in Part I.A further illustrate that when states are 
faced with concealment tactics, they are sometimes forced to respond 
with tactics of their own that previously may have been unacceptable, 
such as anticipatory self-defense, “targeted killings,” or striking where 
they know civilians are present.66  When all of the parties in a conflict 
generally observe their duty to keep military facilities and personnel 
at a distance from the civilian population, it is right to expect a war 
with minimal collateral damage.67  However, since insurgencies and 
terrorist groups, unlike states, do not have their own civilian 
population, they are able to risk civilian lives without facing many of 
                                                          
 63. See infra notes 185–189 and accompanying text (noting that the U.N. 
Charter’s general prohibition on the use of force is slightly tempered by Article 51, 
which allows for collective self-defense). 
 64. Conflicting reports on the same institution’s website about the same incident 
illustrate this problem.  Compare Sarah Leah Whitson, Hezbollah Needs to Answer, 
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/10/05/lebano14336.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 
2007) (“Human Rights Watch’s research found that on a number of occasions 
Hezbollah unjustifiably endangered Lebanese civilians by storing weapons in civilian 
homes, firing rockets from populated areas, and allowing its fighters to operate from 
civilian homes.  Hezbollah also used children as active combatants, another violation 
of the law.”), with HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ISRAEL/LEBANON:  END INDISCRIMINATE 
STRIKES ON CIVILIANS (2006), http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/08/02/lebano 
13902.htm (urging “Israel to immediately end indiscriminate attacks and distinguish 
at all times between civilians and combatants”).  Simply calling on both sides to stop 
their attacks is an unrealistic solution.  See supra note 21 and accompanying text 
(observing a necessary choice between greater and lesser evils in a self-defense 
context).  These analytical problems are not being introduced to judge where Israel 
and Hezbollah did or did not conduct themselves justly during their most recent 
conflict, but rather to show the potential contradictions of international law 
regarding a human shield scenario. 
 65. See infra text accompanying notes 89–95 (arguing that a failure to consider 
the attacker’s necessity is inconsistent with some widely-held conceptions of justice). 
 66. See Gross, Human Shields, supra note 7, at 524 (“[I]n exceptional cases 
complying with the test of proportionality, it is possible to neutralize the moral flaw 
attaching to [an attack on an appropriate target at the cost of lives surrounding that 
target.]”); Kendall, supra note 13, at 1086–88 (concluding that in light of the 
persistent threat posed by leaders of terrorist groups, and the strategic advantages to 
be gained, “targeted killings” should be construed as legal acts of self-defense under 
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter). 
 67. Cf. Gabor Rona, Interesting Times for International Humanitarian Law:  
Challenges from the “War on Terror”, FLETCHER F. OF WORLD AFF., Winter/Spring 2003, 
at 55, 67 (observing that “[t]errorism is . . . a wholesale rejection” of the principles of 
proportionality and distinction).   
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the consequences that states would encounter.68  Also, many non-state 
actors are able to arm and strike quickly, meaning that if states want 
to protect their own civilians, they may have to strike with such haste 
that they are unable to be as precise in their targeting as was 
previously expected.69 
For example, Israel has engaged in “anticipatory self-defense” 
against Hezbollah fighters.70  While many interpretations of 
international law hold that such military action is wrong, those 
interpretations often fail to fully account for the threat posed by the 
non-state actors who are threatening civilian lives in the first place.71  
There is a strong argument that such an anticipatory action could 
save civilian lives by allowing the state to attack militants when they 
are furthest from civilians, and by preventing future attacks on 
civilians that intelligence and/or history show are nearly certain.72 
Since international law on this matter is based in, among other 
things, considerations of proportionality, it is time to question the 
calculations currently embodied therein.73  The law of war should not 
place states who try to follow their aims at a disadvantage.74  But 
because current international law does not fully consider human 
                                                          
 68. Conversely, when states aim to protect those same civilian lives, they often pay 
for doing so with the lives of their own soldiers.  See Gross, Human Shields, supra note 
7, at 459–60 (observing that a state’s soldiers may be called upon to abstain from 
defending themselves, and thus to die, in order to avoid harming enemy civilians 
with whom terrorists are hiding). 
 69. Cf. A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 73 (1996) (noting how time 
constraints make it difficult for militaries to evacuate civilians from areas they plan to 
attack). 
 70. See Beres, supra note 32, at 141 (detailing Israel’s operation “Grapes of 
Wrath,” which was a response to rocket bombardments from Hezbollah fighters in 
southern Lebanon).  According to some theorists, the threat of an imminent attack 
justifies an act of “anticipatory self-defense” the same way that an attack justifies 
customary self-defense measures.  Id. at 149-50.  Israel considered the “Grapes of 
Wrath” operation to be anticipatory self-defense because they had obtained 
intelligence regarding impending Hezbollah rocket attacks.  Id. at 143-44. 
 71. See Mirko Bagaric & John Morss, In Search of Coherent Jurisprudence for 
International Criminal Law:  Correlating Universal Human Responsibilities with Universal 
Human Rights, 29 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 157, 176–77, 191 (2006) (arguing for a 
“zero tolerance” policy for civilian deaths, but ignoring the possibility that those 
attacks are justified by offering the rationale that “terrorism does not currently seem 
to be an international crime”). 
 72. See Guruli, supra note 13, at 119–20 (observing that when the U.N. Charter 
was drafted, judging whether an “imminent threat” justified anticipatory self-defense 
was easier because states could observe hostile troop movements, but now a new 
formulation of the anticipatory self-defense doctrine is needed to protect the right of 
self-defense and to ensure that the doctrine “does not become a license for major 
powers to open wars against whomever they desire”). 
 73. Cf. supra notes 66–67 (observing varying expectations of proportionality 
under differing circumstances, especially in novel situations). 
 74. See infra Part II (drawing analogies between domestic law and international 
just war principles). 
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shield tactics, it is subjected to interpretations that pervert its original 
aims and rationales.75 
II. DOMESTIC ANALOGIES:  HOW DOMESTIC LAW ADDRESSES 
SITUATIONS ANALOGOUS TO THE USE OF HUMAN SHIELDS 
A. The Bank Robber–Human Shield Analogy 
Criminal law in the United States draws lines between behaviors 
that society has deemed acceptable and those it has deemed 
unacceptable.76  This goal is similar to the pursuit in the international 
arena of just rules to govern the use of force.77  The reasons why 
certain acts are deemed legal or illegal in a given country can 
therefore explain why analogous acts in the context of armed conflict 
should be prohibited.78  Accordingly, criminal laws that attribute 
culpability in situations analogous to the use of human shields serve 
                                                          
 75. See Austin & Kolenc, supra note 48, at 330 (expressing concern that political 
pressure on the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (“ICC”), as well as 
frauds such as placing civilians near “high-priority targets” to create civilian casualties 
from attacks, could allow certain parties to exploit the ICC); cf. Rona, supra note 67, 
at 70 (“The Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols did not anticipate 
September 11 or al-Qaeda.”).  
 76. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, in FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 45 
(Leo Katz, Michael S. Moore & Stephen J. Morse eds., 1999) (expressing the 
common belief that criminal punishment is an expression of “condemnation of . . . 
persons who are capable of choice and who have breached established standards of 
behavior”). 
 77. The unjustified use of force is a behavior that has been widely declared 
unacceptable.  See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (“All [m]embers shall refrain . . . 
from the threat or use of force against . . . any other state . . . .”).  See generally Sean D. 
Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of “Armed Attack” in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, 43 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 41, 51 (2002) (realizing that “the desire to minimize the 
transboundary use of military force is central to contemporary world order”). 
 78. There is, however, a contingent of scholars who object to using domestic 
analogies.  See, e.g., YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 181 (4th ed. 
2005) (suggesting that possible future developments in international law may, over 
time, render such analogies inapposite); Kenneth Anderson, Kenneth Anderson’s 
Law of War and Just War Theory Blog:  Charles Dunlap on Why Using the Military in 
Law Enforcement is a Bad Idea, http://kennethandersonlawofwar.blogspot.com/20 
06/09/charles-dunlap-on-why-using-military-in.html (Sept. 30, 2006:  18:05 EDT) 
(discussing the practical and theoretical implications of involving the military in law 
enforcement roles and hinting that differences between the two are significant and 
limit the strength of international-domestic analogies).  Anderson argues, inter alia, 
that in a settled society, imposing law upon a state’s citizens by force is an option only 
for police, but in a just war, both sides are permitted to use force.  Id.  This 
difference matters because the law of war should not take sides, like domestic law 
does.  Id.  So, while criminal law endorses police behavior so long as it comports with 
a predetermined legal standard, international law requires quick determinations of 
proportionality that cannot be equated to criminal law because of their supposed 
neutrality.  Id.  Dinstein objects to equating a person’s right to self-defense with a 
state’s right of self-defense, arguing that the former is likely grounded in natural law, 
but the latter is a prerogative that can be curtailed.  DINSTEIN, supra, at 181. 
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as useful references in determining the appropriate language for 
international laws regarding human shield tactics.79 
Recall Alan Dershowitz’s bank robbery analogy discussed in the 
Introduction.80  The robber in Dershowitz’s analogy would be liable 
for murder on the basis of a legal principle that is codified in many 
state laws, as well as the Model Penal Code (“MPC”).81  The relevant 
passage in the MPC states: 
[C]riminal homicide constitutes murder when:  . . . (b) it is 
committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme 
indifference to the value of human life.  Such recklessness and 
indifference are presumed if the actor is engaged or is an 
accomplice in the commission of . . . robbery . . . arson, burglary, 
kidnapping, or felonious escape.82 
At first, imposing liability for a murder one did not physically 
commit might seem counterintuitive.83  But this principle has been 
                                                          
 79. See infra Part II (comparing international and domestic law and suggesting 
that current international law might not align with popular conceptions of justice).  
Notwithstanding critiques, domestic analogies can potentially make a meaningful 
contribution to the discussion of international law and human shield tactics in light 
of contradictions in international law.  Cf. supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text 
(observing contradictions in international law regarding the appropriate response 
when a state is attacked by an opponent who launches attacks while hiding among 
civilians).  But see DINSTEIN, supra note 78, at 181 (discussing objections to the 
application of an analogy between domestic self-defense principles and international 
law).  
 80. See supra notes 4–9 and accompanying text. 
 81. See infra note 91 (reporting various courts’ applications of state felony 
murder statutes). 
 82. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (1962).  The Model Penal Code reflects a variety 
of ideas, trends and practices in criminal law and thus provides a broad point for 
comparison with international law.  The introductory note for Sections 210.0–210.6 
elaborates on the rule, stating that 
210.2(1)(b) establishes a presumption that the requisite recklessness and 
indifference to the value of human life exist when a homicide is committed 
during the course of certain enumerated felonies. This presumption has the 
effect of abandoning the strict liability aspects of the traditional felony-
murder doctrine but at the same time recognizing the probative significance 
of the concurrence of homicide and a violent felony. 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210 introductory note for Sections 210.0–210.6 (1962). 
 83. The main scholarly critique of such an imposition of liability is that, unlike 
with other types of criminal liability, the law seems to ignore the mens rea of the actor, 
thus imposing a type of strict liability for a crime that carries very grave penalties.  See, 
e.g., Guyora Binder, The Origins of American Felony Murder Rules, 57 STAN. L. REV. 59, 60 
(2004) (cataloguing a long list of scholarly critiques of the felony murder rule and 
addressing the accuracy of commonly-held assumptions about the doctrine’s 
origins).  This critique is quelled by the introductory note accompanying the MPC’s 
section on murder.  See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210 introductory note for Sections 
210.0–210.6 (explaining how the MPC abandons strict liability aspects of the felony-
murder doctrine in favor of a presumption of recklessness and indifference to the 
value of human life).  This critique has not been persuasive enough to stop many 
states from adopting felony-murder laws.  See, e.g., N.J. STAT. § 2C:11–3(a)(3) (2002) 
(defining felony murder in New Jersey); Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Correspondence, 
Murder After the Merger:  A Commentary on Finkelstein, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 561, 561 
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broadly—though not totally—accepted in the United States because 
society sees the felonious creator of the dangerous situation as more 
blameworthy than the officer who pulls the trigger while trying to 
thwart the criminal activity.84 
Culpability in criminal law is based not only on the actions and 
state of mind of the offender, but also on causation.  Though 
different penal codes use varying tests of causation, the MPC 
generally uses a “harm within the risk” test, which holds actors liable 
where the harm inflicted is within the risk posed by a bad action, such 
as using a hostage as a human shield.85  The risk created by hiding 
behind a human shield is precisely that some harm will come to the 
(presumably) innocent party who was unwillingly used as shield.86  
The risk of harm to innocent civilians also motivates the international 
laws that require military facilities to be placed away from civilians.87 
In New Jersey v. Kress,88 a police officer inadvertently shot a hostage 
who was being used as a human shield by a bank robber attempting 
to exit the bank.89  The court held that the indictment of the robber 
for murder was proper under the New Jersey felony murder statute 
because the words in the statute—“or if the death of anyone ensues 
from the committing or attempting to commit [robbery or any 
unlawful act against the peace]”90—encompassed the defendant’s act 
of deliberately placing the victim in a position of “deadly peril” of 
death from an outside force.91  The police officer likely recognized 
                                                          
(2005) (“Despite widespread criticism, the [felony murder] rule remains firmly 
entrenched in many states’ criminal statutes.”). 
 84. See generally Michael S. Moore, Act and Crime, in FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL 
LAW, supra note 76, at 168, 177–78 (surveying the features of the foreseeability, 
“harm within the risk”, aspect causation, and substantial causation tests and noting 
their use in criminal and tort law despite the fact that they are not tests of causation 
in an academic sense). 
 85. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03(2)–(3). 
 86. See, e.g., Pizano v. Superior Court of Tulare County, 577 P.2d 659, 667 (Cal. 
1978) (“The felon foresees [the possibility of harm to an unwilling human shield 
because] . . . if one of the purposes of using a hostage as a shield is to deter hostile 
fire, the other is to absorb it.”). 
 87. See Protocol I, supra note 11, art. 58 (mandating the separation of the civilian 
population and military facilities). 
 88. 253 A.2d 481 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1969). 
 89. Id. at 483. 
 90. N.J. STAT. § 2A:113–1(a)(3) (2002), cited in Kress, 253 A.2d at 519. 
 91. Kress, 253 A.2d at 485–486; see Wilson v. State, 68 S.W.2d 100, 102 (Ark. 1934) 
(“Appellant’s action in forcing [the victim] to a place which was known by him to be 
perilous was just as much the cause of his death as if [Appellant himself] fired the 
fatal shot.  This action was murder at common law and . . . under the [Arkansas 
murder] statute.”); Pizano, 577 P.2d at 667 (“[The victim’s] life was taken on account 
of [defendants’] . . . lawless act, and they are responsible for his murder, whether it 
was occasioned by their own volition or by the shots of their adversaries; and their act 
was the proximate cause of [the victim’s death].”). 
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that shots fired at a criminal hiding behind a human shield might hit 
that innocent person, but the court paid no attention to this fact 
because the officer’s awareness still would not absolve the defendant 
of culpability for creating the deadly situation.92 
Under other common—though slightly different—tests of 
causation, the robber would also be held responsible for the victim’s 
death.93  For example, a California court upheld a defendant’s 
murder conviction because using the victim as a human shield 
“proximately caused” the victim’s death even though a neighbor fired 
the shot.94  Similarly, an Arkansas court ruled that a defendant who 
used a human shield can be said to have “directly caused” the victim’s 
death because that death “result[ed] naturally” from the defendant’s 
conduct.95 
The international forum, where theories of “mechanistic 
causation” often take precedence, does not always follow this logic.96  
These theories place blame with the party whose act was closer in 
time and/or space to the civilian deaths without explicitly requiring 
the contemplation of other causal factors.97  Unfortunately, 
codifications of the principle of non-combatant distinction98 are 
sometimes interpreted such that individual military actions are 
viewed in a vacuum.99  A state’s reasons for staging an attack that 
results in incidental damage may not even be considered by those 
decreeing that the state violated international law.100  For example, in 
                                                          
 92. See Kress, 253 A.2d at 486 (imputing liability solely for creating the deadly 
situation). 
 93. For a list of the tests of causation used in criminal law, see Moore, supra note 
84, at 175–78. 
 94. Pizano, 577 P.2d at 665 (“[I]f the trier of fact concludes that . . . [the] death 
[of one of the robbers] proximately resulted from acts of petitioner’s accomplices done 
with conscious disregard for human life, the natural consequences of which were 
dangerous to life, then petitioner may be convicted of . . . murder.” (quoting Taylor 
v. Superior Court, 477 P.2d 131, 134 (Cal. 1970))(emphasis added). 
 95. Wilson, 68 S.W.2d at 102. 
 96. See infra text accompanying note 153 (discussing Article 52 of Protocol I and 
the prohibition of attacks on non-military targets). 
 97. See Protocol I, supra note 11, arts. 50–52 (proclaiming that the presence of 
non-civilians does not deprive an area of its civilian nature, but failing to address 
causal factors in civilian deaths, such as the use of human shields, which might 
warrant shifting culpability to the actor who used human shields). 
 98. See infra Part III.B (discussing embodiments of just war theory in 
international law). 
 99. Not everyone interprets international law in this manner, but the fact that 
international law’s language creates the potential for this interpretation wrongly 
contributes legitimacy to those who decry countries for taking justified defense 
actions.  See Gross, Thwarting Terrorist Acts, supra note 14, at 205–06 (expressing 
concern that by declaring that the presence of non-civilians does not deprive an area 
of its civilian nature, terrorists might be granted unfair advantages). 
 100. See Beres, supra note 32, at 143–45 (recounting how mapping errors in 
operation “Grapes of Wrath” allegedly caused the shelling of civilian refugees and 
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1996, following repeated Hezbollah rocket attacks from the north 
and a responsive Israeli self-defense action that struck a site housing 
Lebanese civilians, the U.N. found that Israeli forces had attacked the 
civilians deliberately.101  This finding ignored (1) the Israeli 
intelligence showing that bombers were in the area struck; (2) the 
fact that the U.N.’s map was inaccurate, thus compromising the 
accuracy of Israeli targeting systems; and most importantly, (3) the 
illegal proximity of the aggressors to the protected site.102 
The U.N.’s analysis above differs from U.S. criminal law which, 
through tests of causation, considers which party originally created 
the deadly situation.103  In the robbery cases discussed above, the 
murder statutes required the courts’ analyses to include 
determinations of who created the deadly situation and of the 
necessity of the police action.104  However, if domestic courts followed 
the U.N.’s approach as described above, the analysis would begin 
(temporally) when the police officer fired his weapon and after the 
robber created the hazard.105  This discrepancy seems even more 
anomalous when one considers that international law regarding legal 
justifications for using force, like criminal law, requires analysis of the 
context in which an act is taken.106 
The “harm within the risk” test is appropriate to apply in the 
international human shield context because, like the principle of 
distinction, it is intended to determine culpability justly in the event 
of injury to bystanders.107  Given the difficult decisions forced upon 
the state that must choose how to respond, it is unjust to hold states 
accountable for reasonable measures taken to protect their citizens 
when the only other option is to sacrifice security, sovereignty, or 
                                                          
noting the Israeli ambassador’s objection that the suggestion of a deliberate attack 
on civilians was absurd). 
 101. Id. at 143–44. 
 102. Id. at 143–45. 
 103. See supra notes 88–95 and accompanying text (indicating examples in the 
domestic criminal framework for assessing causation where an actor creates a deadly 
situation). 
 104. See supra notes 91–95 and accompanying text (addressing the imputation of 
liability solely on the basis of creating a deadly situation). 
 105. Cf. H.L.A. Hart & A.M. Honore, Causation in the Law, in FOUNDATIONS OF 
CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 76, at 179, 186 (finding that where one actor’s actions 
create a “necessity” to act for another actor, the law must make judgments about “the 
importance of the respective interests sacrificed and preserved”). 
 106. An essential part of the robber analogy is that the robber, before being fired 
upon, has already committed at least one crime.  Cf. infra Part III.B (discussing the 
international crime of aggression and when the use of force is justified). 
 107. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210 introductory note for Sections 210.0–210.6 
(1962) (explaining that Section 210.2 of the Model Penal Code was designed to 
recognize “the probative significance of the concurrence of homicide and a violent 
felony”). 
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both.108  The “harm within the risk” doctrine would help international 
law apportion culpability more justly by shifting responsibility for the 
deaths of human shields away from states compelled to exercise their 
right of self-defense, and towards actors who initially create the 
danger to civilians.109 
B. The Haystack Fire–Human Shield Analogy 
Tort law also provides a useful analogy when considering what 
actions would be just responses to an international actor who uses 
human shields.110  Tort law, like criminal law, draws lines between 
acceptable and unacceptable behavior.111  Tort law’s focus on 
distribution of losses is motivated by both moral and economic 
considerations; this Comment focuses primarily on the moral 
issues.112 
Two features of tort law are particularly analogous to the 
international human shield problem.  First, in order to discourage 
dangerous behavior, tort law creates “duties” that are owed to other 
parties in the name of justice.113  Duties also exist in international law, 
but the duties in the international context sometimes conflict and 
therefore put actors in a position where they may have to violate at 
least one duty to fulfill another.  For example, Articles 51 and 58 of 
                                                          
 108. See DINSTEIN, supra note 78, at 178 (explaining that under Article 51 of the 
U.N. Charter, a self-defense action necessarily utilizes legal force against users of 
illegal force); WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS, supra note 23, at 53–54 (arguing that 
because states “contract” with citizens to provide certain rights, the state should be 
able to protect these rights when they are collectively threatened, just as an 
individual would defend such rights if they were challenged on a personal level).  
Some scholars even consider self-defense a moral obligation.  E.g., DINSTEIN, supra 
note 78, at 178–79 (examining conceptions of self-defense as a right, as opposed to a 
duty). 
 109. See infra Part IV.A (proposing principles for a new standard of international 
law). 
 110. See infra Part IV.B (explaining the reasons for examining domestic analogies 
to the human shield problem). 
 111. Many different conceptions of justice justify the principles of tort law.  See 
IZHAK ENGLARD, THE PHILOSOPHY OF TORT LAW 7–9 (1993) (noting the frequency of 
utilitarian justifications of tort law, but questioning whether those perspectives 
contradict the idea of moral responsibility); ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE 
LAW 134–36, 145–203 (1995) (justifying tort law from a corrective justice perspective 
because tort law clarifies the nature of “direct connections” between parties); 
Gregory C. Keating, A Social Conception of the Tort Law of Accidents, in PHILOSOPHY AND 
THE LAW OF TORTS 22, 22–23 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001) (advancing a justification 
for tort law based in social contract theory). 
 112. See ENGLARD, supra note 111, at 7–9 (noticing that since tort law imposes a 
semi-utilitarian model of using economic liabilities to shape behavior, economic 
concerns are frequently intertwined with moral ones, and questioning the propriety 
of mixing these considerations). 
 113. See, e.g., MARGARET BRAZIER, STREET ON TORTS 171–72 (1993) (summarizing 
various historical tort law duties of care). 
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Protocol I establish two “duties,” but fail to explain their relationship 
in a way that makes establishing liability difficult when both duties 
have been violated in a conflict.114  Second, in deciding how losses 
should be distributed, tort law deters behavior that is unnecessarily 
destructive while still allowing for other behavior that is destructive 
but justified by a greater need.115  This principle, while embraced by 
just war theory, is not clearly reflected in current international law 
when it comes to human shield tactics.116 
Consider the classic English case of Vaughan v. Menlove.117  In that 
case, the defendant was warned that a haystack he built was likely to 
catch fire because of its shoddy construction.118  The haystack did 
catch fire and the flames blew onto a neighbor’s cottages that then 
burned down.119  The court held the defendant liable because he had 
                                                          
 114. See Protocol I, supra note 11, art. 44, para. 3 (“In order to promote the 
protection of the civilian population from the effects of hostilities, combatants are 
obliged to distinguish themselves from the civilian population while they are 
engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack.”).  Compare 
Protocol I, supra note 11, art. 51, para. 2 (establishing the illegality of firing upon 
civilian targets), and Protocol I, supra note 11, art. 58 (requiring the separation of 
civilian and military objects), with U.N. Charter art. 51 (explaining that the right of 
self-defense should not be impaired in the face of an “armed attack”).  Article 51 of 
Protocol I prohibits intentionally firing upon civilian targets, but if the actor who 
harms civilians can show that it had a military objective, then their attack does not 
illegally target civilians.  JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, 
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, VOLUME I:  RULES 34-35 (Int’l Comm. 
of the Red Cross, 2005) Committee (explaining that civilian areas lose their 
protected status to the extent that they are used in a manner that makes them valid 
military objectives).  The problem is that human shield tactics create doubt as to the 
character of a target, and in situations where a target’s nature is in doubt, attacks on 
that area are prohibited notwithstanding the fact that a threat to security may still be 
emanating from that area.  See Protocol I, supra note 11, art. 52, para. 3; see also 
HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 114, at 34-36 (reporting that the U.S. has 
objected to this policy because it “ignore[s] the realities of war in demanding a 
degree of certainty that seldom exists in combat.”).  Thus while Article 51 may not 
directly prohibit attacks on areas where human shields are being used, it makes such 
attacks unlikely to be legal because the nature of those areas will be difficult to 
ascertain.  See supra notes 47–49 (relaying instances where human shield tactics have 
made military objectives look like civilian ones).   
 115. See, e.g., BRAZIER, supra note 113, at 86–87 (discussing self-defense, defense of 
others, and defense of property in tort law, all of which allow for certain destructive 
behaviors in order to prevent other harms).  
 116. The Doctrine of Double Effect (“DDE”) is a means for making this type of 
calculation.  See infra notes 172–174 and accompanying text (addressing the 
conundrum of collateral damage).  However, current international law reflects the 
DDE as applied to state actors and older tactics.  See infra Part III.B (surveying 
embodiments of just war theory in international law).  As new actors and tactics 
present greater threats, the calculus reflected in international law must change.  See 
Travalio, supra note 1, at 191 (lamenting international law’s lack of a “firm basis” for 
use of force against terrorists); supra Part I.B  (exploring how current international 
law can actually give advantages to actors who use human shields). 
 117. 3 Bing. (N.C.) 467, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P. 1837). 
 118. Id. at 468, 132 Eng. Rep. at 491. 
 119. Id. at 469, 132 Eng. Rep. at 491. 
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a responsibility to use his property in a way that would not injure 
others.120  The court’s reasoning rested partially on the fact that the 
defendant created a situation where damages were reasonably 
foreseeable.121 
This situation is not as far removed from the discussion of human 
shield tactics as one might initially think.  After all, the court held 
that the defendant’s right to use his property ceases at the point 
where he puts someone else (or someone else’s property) in harm’s 
way.122  This rationale is similar to the proclamation of Article 58 of 
Protocol I that combatants must keep their military targets away from 
civilians when launching an attack.123  Like a fire resulting from a 
shoddily-built haystack, attacks on military targets are foreseeable 
during the course of armed conflict, so the people in control of those 
targets must keep their military facilities away from areas where 
injuries to civilians are likely.124  Failure to take this duty into account 
in the tort scenario results in liability because of the popular 
conception that losses should not lie with someone who was acting 
within his or her rights and did not create the hazardous situation.125  
This position can once again be traced to tort law’s tendency to 
equate many types of indirect causation with responsibility.126  
                                                          
 120. Id. at 476, 132 Eng. Rep. at 493 (Park, J.). 
 121. Id. at 474, 132 Eng. Rep. at 493 (Tindal, C.J.).  The defendant received 
warnings regarding the likelihood of damages and still took no action to protect his 
neighbor’s property, much like the fighters in the Jenin refugee camp took no action 
to remove themselves or civilians from a dangerous area despite receiving warning of 
pending self-defense actions.  See Gross, Human Shields, supra note 7, at 500 
(characterizing the Jenin refugee camp as a “hornet’s nest” rife with “fighting men” 
prepared for any amount of sacrifice, including the lives of Palestinian civilians). 
 122. Vaughan, 3 Bing. (N.C.) at 476, 132 Eng. Rep. at 493 (Park, J.). 
 123. Protocol I, supra note 11, art. 58.  Remember that all actors in a conflict are 
bound by international humanitarian law, including provisions designed to protect 
civilians.  See International Committee of the Red Cross, supra note 55; see HENCKAERTS & 
DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 114, at 71-73 (explaining the parameters of an attacker’s 
duty to avoid locating military objectives near civilians). 
 124. See ROGERS, supra note 69, at 28 (observing the increasing strategic 
importance of attacking not only enemy troops, but also enemy military equipment 
and facilities, and noting how this practice has been accepted since the early 
twentieth century); Derek Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, 66 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 1, 10–17 (cataloging the frequency of reprisals and self-defense actions in the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict). 
 125. See Keating, supra note 111, at 27 (arguing, under social contract theory, that 
tort law distributes losses this way because free citizens implicitly agree that security is 
of similar importance as freedom); Arthur Ripstein & Benjamin C. Zipursky, 
Corrective Justice in an Age of Mass Torts, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS, supra 
note 112, at 214, 224 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001) (considering that under 
corrective justice theory, tort damages are imposed as a means of assigning 
ownership of risks to the party most deserving). 
 126. See supra note 84 and accompanying text (surveying different tests of 
causation used to find individuals liable for damages they did not directly cause). 
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Yet in the international context, there is often swift condemnation 
when civilian casualties result from an attack that is directed at a 
military target (personnel or facilities) located near or within an area 
populated by civilians.127  This position misses the fact that, if a 
military action was justified as a self-defense measure, that attack was 
most likely foreseeable.128  This foreseeability is important because if 
an actor can foresee (or provokes) an attack, that actor must take 
care to remove their military operations away from civilians.  Yet, 
international law’s conflicting duties allow some to interpret such 
self-defense measures as per se violations of the principle of 
distinction.129  As stated above, there is both a duty to avoid placing 
military targets near civilians and also a duty not to fire near 
civilians.130  Since these often-conflicting duties provide little guidance 
as to which party is to blame in a human shield scenario, clarification 
is needed.131 
An examination of the tort defenses of self-defense and defense of 
property helps explain why it is more just to clarify the conflicting 
duties as follows:  placing civilians in harm’s way is the basis for 
culpability in a human shield scenario where the military response is 
                                                          
 127. See Austin & Kolenc, supra note 48, at 328–29 (expressing concern at how 
political pressures from non-governmental organizations, and not the ICC’s own 
initiative, prompted investigation of NATO’s tactics in Kosovo, and worrying that 
political motives could bias such investigations); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FATAL 
STRIKES:  ISRAEL’S INDISCRIMINATE ATTACKS IN LEBANON:  ATTACKS ON CIVILIAN HOMES 
(2006), http://hrw.org/r eports/2 0 0 6 / l e b a n o n 0806/ 5.htm#_Toc142299223 
(surveying several Israeli military options in Lebanon, but only personally taking 
interviews from villagers—and not Israeli military intelligence officials—regarding 
the presence of military personnel and equipment);.  This is not meant to suggest 
that the Human Rights Watch reports are incorrect, but rather to illustrate how the 
more politically powerful party to a conflict is often judged from a less than impartial 
viewpoint. 
 128. See supra note 124 and accompanying text (discussing how military facilities 
need to be built away from major civilian populations because attacks on both enemy 
troops and military facilities have become widely accepted, and as a result, 
foreseeable). 
 129. See, e.g., Reynolds, supra note 9, at 82–83 (explaining how Amnesty 
International interpreted Article 52(2) of Protocol I very narrowly to decry an attack 
on a Serbian television station that was disseminating propaganda, despite the fact 
that the humanitarian International Committee of the Red Cross specifically 
considered the station to be a legitimate military target); see also infra note 211 
(explaining how the non-reciprocal nature of international law can lay blame upon 
states whose actions were justified but for the human shield tactics of another party 
to the conflict).  
 130. See supra note 114 and accompanying text (delineating the two duties that 
Articles 51(2) and 58 of Protocol I establish:  a duty to refrain from firing upon 
civilian targets, and a duty to separate civilian and military objects). 
 131. See id. (declaring that Protocol I fails to explain how liability is established 
when the duties created in Articles 51 and 58 are violated). 
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justified and is not unnecessarily destructive.132  Domestic law allows 
one to perform acts that would usually be prohibited when those acts 
are necessary to prevent a greater harm to oneself.133  However, acts 
performed in self-defense or defense of property are only permitted 
where two conditions are met.  First, the decision that a self-defense 
action is needed must be reasonable.134  Second, that act must be 
reasonably designed to effectively end the threat and cannot be more 
destructive than is reasonably believed to be necessary to extinguish 
the threat.135  If a person’s actions meet these requirements, then that 
person is neither liable to the person who presented the threat, nor 
anyone who was incidentally harmed.136  For example, in the classic 
case of Morris v. Platt137 the defendant fired a gun in self-defense as he 
was being assailed with various weapons and his shots accidentally 
struck the plaintiff, who was an innocent bystander.  The court held 
that there is no cause of action for an innocent bystander who is 
accidentally harmed by a person who is using force reasonably 
intended to defend against a third party’s attack.138   
The self-defense rule in torts is supported by many of the same 
principles of justice that motivated the U.N. Charter to include a 
                                                          
 132. For a summary of these tort defenses, see BRAZIER, supra note 113, at 86–88.  
Sovereignty and independence are widely valued, and the only way to preserve these 
ideals on an individual level is to allow states to defend themselves effectively.  See 
WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS, supra note 23, at 53 (“When states are attacked, it is 
their members who are challenged, not only in their lives, but also in the sum of 
things they value most, including the political association they have made.”).  This 
same principle is embodied in torts, but the rights are on an individual level.  See, e.g., 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 65 (1965) (establishing that “an actor is 
privileged to defend himself against another by force intended or likely to cause 
death or serious bodily harm”). 
 133. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921) (holding that a 
defendant who shot an attacker should be immune from prosecution if he 
reasonably believed he was fighting for his life). 
 134. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 65 (1965) (stating that an actor is 
permitted to use deadly force “when he reasonably believes that the other is about to 
inflict upon him . . . bodily harm . . . [and] is thereby put in peril of death or serious 
bodily harm . . .”).  In the international context, this would correlate with jus ad 
bellum principles, as it purports to justify the use of force in a given scenario.  See 
supra note 26 (defining jus ad bellum).  Admittedly, this element of the right to self-
defense is somewhat outside the scope of this Comment, but relevant to the extent 
that without meeting the requirement of just cause, there can be no discussion of 
what type of force is permissible.  See infra notes 188–189 and accompanying text 
(discussing some of the threshold requirements for determining what constitutes 
“just cause” for military self-defense action). 
 135. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 65 cmt. on subsection (1). 
 136. See, e.g., id. § 75 (declaring that a self-defense act “subjects the actor to 
liability to a third person for any harm unintentionally done to him only if the actor 
realizes or should realize that his act creates an unreasonable risk of causing such 
harm”) (emphasis added). 
 137. 32 Conn. 75 (1864). 
 138. Id. at 11. 
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right to self-defense for states.139  Popular conceptions of justice, as 
well as state practices, suggest that freedom from aggression is an 
inherent right.140  However, there is no specific right to be free from 
incidental damage where a state is exercising self-defense against 
actors who use human shields.141  Analysis should focus on the 
defending actor’s necessity and the means used because examining 
only the harm sustained by the bystander(s) will not shed light on 
whether the attack itself was acceptable.142 
In international law, unlike tort and criminal law, self-defense can 
be forced to take a back seat to the principle of distinction, even 
when the action is arguably necessary in light of the circumstances.143  
Admittedly, measuring and compensating for damages for past losses 
in tort law is simpler than in international conflicts.144  But for 
                                                          
 139. See DINSTEIN, supra note 78, at 176 (“The legal notion of self-defence has its 
roots in inter-personal relations, and is sanctified in domestic legal systems since time 
immemorial.”). 
 140. See STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA, War, supra note 26 (attributing the development 
of states’ right to defend against aggression to theorists such as Aristotle, Augustine, 
Grotius, Locke, and Walzer, and also to international law such as the Hague 
Conventions, Geneva Conventions, and Nuremberg tribunals); cf. JOHN STUART MILL, 
ON LIBERTY 73–74 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., 1978) (1859) (arguing that society has a 
right to protect itself, but not to protect individuals from harming themselves). 
 141. This concept is embraced in tort law, just war theory, and (arguably) 
international law.  See Morris, 32 Conn. at 11 (refusing to adopt a rule that would 
allow an innocent by-stander to recover damages for harm caused by a third party 
acting in lawful self-defense); Bagaric & Morss, supra note 71, at 175 (lamenting that 
innocent deaths may be justified by the DDE).  See generally Kenneth Anderson, Who 
Owns the Rules of War?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2003, § 6 (Magazine), at 38 
(acknowledging both the benefits and risks that Protocol I presents to civilians). 
 142. This analysis requires determinations of both just cause and proportionality, 
which can only be accomplished through examining all relevant factors.  See infra 
notes 171–173 and accompanying text (discussing distinction, proportionality, and 
the DDE). 
 143. See DINSTEIN, supra note 78, at 246–47 (discussing how varying definitions of 
necessity can significantly broaden or narrow the right to self-defense); Israel and 
Hizbollah Committed Major violations During the Recent Conflict:  UN Experts, UN NEWS 
CENTRE,  Oct. 4, 2006, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=20134&Cr 
=middle&Cr1=east (reporting that the UN’s Human Rights Council decried attacks 
from both Israel and Hezbollah that killed civilians, and relaying the message of an 
Israeli Ambassador who questioned why the report did not discuss culpability for the 
uninstigated rocket attacks that began the conflict and may have made distinction 
more difficult); supra notes 41–46 and accompanying text (noting a lack of 
consideration of Israel’s necessity by those decrying its military actions).  Note that 
this examples is not being used to judge the legality of these specific uses of force, 
but to demonstrate the tension that can arise between right of self-defense and the 
principal of distinction.   
 144. Like tort law, international law should strive to be both reactive (in 
condemning illegal acts) and proactive (in deterring future violations of law).  See 
ENGLARD, supra note 111, at 36–37, 43–44 (describing the goals of the economic 
analysis common to American tort law as attempts to both solve “concrete issues of 
liability” and use liability rules to deter future negligent behavior); Campbell, supra 
note 12, at 1093–94 (worried that determining the true threat posed by the 1998 
bombing of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania is not fairly captured 
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conflicts involving concealment warfare, the rules should be 
structured with the goal of guiding behavior before countries act in 
self-defense, and not just passing judgment after the fact.145  Rules 
that more effectively ensure the right to reasonable and necessary 
self-defense actions in the human shield context can help make  
international law more just, and discourage perfidious tactics whose 
continued use will only lead to more deaths in the future.146 
III. JUST WAR THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
A. A Starting Point for New Law147 
Some scholars argue that current international law favors strong 
actors over weaker ones,148 while others have posited the exact 
opposite—that stronger state actors are now disadvantaged under 
international law in light of newer tactics.149  These conflicting 
arguments illustrate two points central to this Comment:  (1) debate 
                                                          
through condemnations of those attacks because those attacks—beyond killing 
hundreds—also indicate a likelihood of  future strikes against similar targets). 
 145. See William V. O’Brien, Reprisals, Deterrence and Self-Defense in Counterterror 
Operations, 30 VA. J. INT’L L. 421, 477–78 (1989) (recognizing that at times, 
preventative defense measures are the most effective means of combating terrorism, 
and that moral and practical dilemmas posed by such actions can be quelled through 
compliance with specific limits); Travalio, supra note 1, at 190–91 (calling for nations 
“opposed to international terrorism” to “explicitly articulate the bases, with 
appropriate limitations, under which military force can be used to combat 
international terrorism”). 
 146. See Stefan Gosepath, The Scope of Global Justice, in GLOBAL JUSTICE 145, 148 
(Thomas W. Pogge ed., 2001) (explaining that codification of general principles 
helps to strengthens parties’ rights by memorializing an agreement on certain 
entitlements, like self-defense); Kieval, supra note 22, at 898 (“Let us give States the 
tools they need to quash the terrorist threat and protect their own citizens, while 
giving them meaningful, realistic guidance to protect those civilians who might 
otherwise suffer as a result of those defensive actions.”). 
 147. John Rawls’ concept of the “original position” is valuable in trying to asses the 
justice of current iterations of international law of war.  RAWLS, supra note 20, at 14–
18.  The “original position” is a hypothetical bargaining position in which the parties 
that are considering a set of rules do not know their position in society.  Id. at 15.  
Rawls argues that social consensus is important to the legitimacy of any rules, and 
more importantly, indicative that the rules agreed upon are themselves just because 
(presumably) people would not agree to unjust rules.  Id. at 14.  The argument then 
follows, that since the bargaining parties do not know their position in the world, 
they will only argue for just rules and not ones that benefit one party at the expense 
of another.  Id. at 15.  This argument is a strong justification for looking not only at 
specific incidents of human shield tactics, but also analyzing those tactics in the 
abstract by comparing them against legal measures that have been taken to stop 
dangerous acts in different contexts.  Id. 
 148. See Swiney, supra note 13, at 733 (“Distinction rests on an outdated view of the 
world, and asks the impossible of the weak and little of the powerful.”). 
 149. See Reynolds, supra note 9, at 107 (“The rules of war created on the basis of 
ideals adopted by western society have become central to adversaries employing 
concealment warfare methods.”). 
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about how to handle the new tactics in international law is more 
focused on what particular groups have to gain and lose than on what 
is just in the abstract; and (2) international law is not clear in 
addressing how human shield tactics should be handled.150 
Many principles of just war theory transcend national boundaries 
and therefore can form a starting point for the debate about 
acceptable military tactics in the human shield situation because they 
provide common ground for concerned parties.151  Indeed, just war 
theory is motivated by many different philosophies (as opposed to 
state policies), such as distributive, retributive, and restorative 
justice.152  By examining similar legal principles in analogous 
situations, such as certain scenarios that arise in domestic tort and 
criminal law,153 these basic notions of justice can be codified in 
international law to provide useful guidance regarding human shield 
tactics.154 
                                                          
 150. When foreign policies are justified solely in terms of state interests, and not 
in terms of international aims, the international community likely will view them as 
less legitimate, thus potentially negating the merits of those policies.  See Gross, 
Thwarting Terrorist Acts, supra note 14, at 196 (lamenting that Israel’s 2000 military 
policy “aimed at neutralizing the terrorist organizations” was characterized by some 
as “Israel’s elimination policy,” thus biasing judgment on whether its actions were in 
fact necessary and just); see also Arunabha Bhoumik, Democratic Responses to Terrorism:  
A Comparative Study of the United States, Israel, and India 33 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 
285, 337–38 (expressing concern that Indian legislation which establishes a policy for 
designating groups as “terrorist organizations” could be used not only as a means for 
fighting terrorism, but also to imprison political enemies who have not acted 
illegally). 
 151. See supra notes 18–20 and accompanying text (noting that the objective of 
political philosophy is to achieve a just society through rational ends and that just war 
principles, originating from actual problems encountered during war, may serve as a 
basis for international legal standards); see also Christopher Lynch, Making War:  The 
Triumph of Just-War Theory, THE WEEKLY STANDARD, Nov. 3, 2003, at 31 (“Out of its 
origins in Augustine and Thomas, and the philosophers of natural law and 
international relations in early modernity, and theories of the last half century . . . 
just war theory has somehow become our common intellectual language about 
war.”). 
 152. See JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, JUST WAR AGAINST TERROR 129–30 (2003) 
(discussing how different philosophies, such as Christianity and the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commissions in South Africa, contribute to the ideas of just war 
theory).  Elshtain posits that, for most Christians, justice includes retributive justice, 
which is focused on restraining evildoers; distributive justice, which strives to create 
“equitable circumstances”; and restorative justice, which should help groups cope 
with an unjust past.  Id.  Though characterizations of just war tradition in Islam vary 
greatly, Elshtain quotes one prominent Islamic scholar as saying “when it comes to 
the conduct of war, one finds only small differences between Islam and other 
monotheistic religions or the international laws of war.  Islam recognizes moral 
constraints on military conduct . . . “  Id. at 132–33. 
 153. See supra Part II (demonstrating the utility of various domestic law principles 
for clarifying international law).  But see supra note 78 (describing arguments against 
relying on a domestic analogy when analyzing international law). 
 154. See infra Part IV.A (discussing the current principles of culpability in human 
shield scenarios). 
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B. Embodiments of Just War Theory in International Law 
“Just war tradition represents above all a fund of practical moral 
wisdom, based not in abstract speculation or theorization but in 
reflection on actual problems encountered in war as these have 
presented themselves in different historical circumstances.”155 
The most prominent international laws of war are a reflection of 
just war theory.156  The world looks to documents such as the U.N. 
Charter and the Geneva Conventions because states have mostly 
agreed, at least implicitly, that these laws reflect common moral 
principles.157  So, when international laws158 are ambiguous regarding 
a new practice in combat, it is necessary to look not just at the text of 
international laws, but also the rationales behind them.159  These 
rationales can then be used as a premise for principles of law that 
address appropriate responses to new tactics in combat.160 
                                                          
 155. JAMES TURNER JOHNSON, CAN MODERN WAR BE JUST? 15 (1984) [hereinafter 
JOHNSON, MODERN WAR]. 
 156. See id. at 14, 21 (recognizing sources of law ranging from U.S. Civil War 
Military Orders to the Kellogg-Briand Pact to the U.N. Charter as being heavily 
influenced by the “just war tradition”). 
 157. See id. at 23, 66 (attributing significant influence in the “tradition of just war” 
to religious and secular sources and moral and political theory, and noting how the 
United Nations is creating new laws in an effort to restrict the use of force when it is 
not in the “service of justice”). 
 158. The sources of international law discussed in this Comment are most 
frequently classified as Laws of Armed Conflict, hence the use of the terms 
“combatant” and “belligerent” to refer to the adversaries participating in the conflicts 
within this Comment.  See Reynolds, supra note 9, at 1–2 (describing international law 
regarding targeting decisions and collateral damage as international law of armed 
conflict).  However, the law discussed can also accurately be characterized as 
International Humanitarian Law, or even International Humanitarian Law of Armed 
Conflict.  See Rona, supra note 67, at 55–57 (observing that international 
humanitarian law applies only during armed conflict, but is not implicated by every 
armed conflict, and that even though Protocol I did not anticipate modern armed 
conflicts, it can still “accommodate” and evaluate actions in the fight against 
terrorism).  Finally, some commentators also discuss International Criminal Law in 
relation to the topics addressed in this Comment because criminal law provides the 
method they see as most capable of prosecuting the non-state actors often involved 
in human shield scenarios.  See Bagaric & Morss, supra note 71, at 161–62 (arguing 
that international law will be more coherent and better harmonize human rights and 
responsibilities if international criminal law is used to address offenses that involve 
“homicide and other offenses that unequivocally and significantly set back an agent’s 
vital interests”). 
 159. Not all scholars and politicians consider the laws of war to be ambiguous, but 
with so many different interpretations of the same documents, the disagreements 
themselves are illustrative of a need for greater clarity.  See Travalio, supra note 1, at 
147 (noting disagreements concerning when force can be used within a foreign state 
against a terrorist group, the limitations upon force in those circumstances, and what 
targets are appropriate). 
 160. Cf. JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS:  A RESTATEMENT 3 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001) 
(arguing that justice should be pursued through the articulation of values sought 
from political and social institutions). 
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Distinction and proportionality of means form the core of jus in 
bello principles.161  Distinction (also sometimes known as 
discrimination) requires that militaries must recognize the difference 
between combatants and noncombatants, and only attack the 
former.162  Proportionality, on the other hand, holds that states may  
not use military means that are more destructive than necessary to 
accomplish their legitimate goals.163 
Article 51 of the 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Convention is an iteration of jus in bello principles because it purports 
to establish the immunity of noncombatants.164  It prohibits attacks 
“which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury 
to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, 
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
military advantage.”165 Further, Article 52(2) places a duty on states 
such that 
[a]ttacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives.  In so far as 
objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those 
objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an 
effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial 
destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling 
at the time, offers a definite military advantage.166 
Article 58 is closely related and requires that states 
(a) . . . endeavour to remove the civilian population, individual 
civilians and civilian objects under their control from the vicinity of 
military objectives; (b) [a]void locating military objectives within or 
near densely populated areas; [and] (c) [t]ake the other necessary 
precautions to protect the civilian population, individual civilians 
and civilian objects under their control against the dangers 
resulting from military operations.167 
The concepts of proportionality and noncombatant immunity, 
however, do not necessarily provide clear guidelines for conduct in 
war.168  It is easy to simply declare that noncombatants are immune 
                                                          
 161. See JOHNSON, MORALITY, supra note 14, at 29 tbl.3; STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
War, supra note 26 (surveying the components of jus in bello, which also include a 
requirement to obey weapons prohibitions, standards for treatment of prisoners of 
war, and prohibitions on mala in se means and reprisals). 
 162. STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA, War, supra note 26. 
 163. Id. 
 164. JOHNSON, MORALITY, supra note 14, at 30 tbl.4 (listing “Geneva law” along with 
other provisions regarding “protected persons” as expressions of “Just War Criteria in 
Positive International Law”); ROGERS, supra note 69, at 17 (“Protocol I was 
negotiated . . . to the very concept of proportionality”). 
 165. Protocol I, supra note 11, art. 51, para. (5)(b). 
 166. Id. art. 52, para.(2). 
 167. Id. art. 58. 
 168. Professor Emanuel Gross points out, 
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from being targeted, but in practice, many justified self-defense 
measures have injured or killed civilians.169  The challenge then is to 
figure out when and how much (if any) collateral damage is just, 
when a state must defend against an actor using human shield 
tactics.170  Many past military actions resulting in civilian casualties 
have been justified specifically because the principle of 
proportionality (in its jus in bello context) recognizes that a limited 
amount of collateral damage may be acceptable, so long as the 
military action is not more destructive than necessary to accomplish a 
legitimate goal.171 
To apply the abstract concepts of distinction and proportionality, 
scholars and policy makers have looked to the Doctrine of Double 
                                                          
[i]f we accept the interpretation of self-defense which permits a democratic 
state to defend itself against the terrorist threat by way of military action, 
numerous questions arise in relation to the rules of engagement. How will a 
democratic state conduct a war against an undefined enemy which is 
dispersed among the civilian population? Should the democratic state 
remain subject to the rules of war and avoid causing harm to population 
centers and thereby also avoid causing harm to the terrorists themselves? Or, 
does the goal of eradicating terrorism justify all means, including collateral 
injury to innocent civilians . . . ? 
Gross, Human Shields, supra note 7, at 478 (citing Darrell Cole, 09.11.01:  Death Before 
Dishonor or Dishonor Before Death?  Christian Just War, Terrorism, and Supreme Emergency, 
16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 81, 86 (2002)). 
 169. A problem with applying the rule against targeting innocent civilians is that 
knowledge of an actor’s thoughts is necessary to determine whether the harm to 
civilians was intended, or just foreseeable.  Cf. HYMAN GROSS, A THEORY OF CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 84 (1979) [hereinafter HYMAN GROSS, THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE] (pointing 
out that intent in criminal law is not only a mental state, but also, under an 
“objective” standard is considered as a dimension of the act itself).  In the 
international context, if a permissible result is subjectively intended, and an 
impermissible result is foreseeable, no authoritative source defines whether the 
impermissible result is considered intentional—though there are no shortage of 
opinions.  Compare Gross, Human Shields, supra note 7, at 488 (arguing that in such a 
situation only the attacks on terrorists are intentional), with HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
FATAL STRIKES:  ISRAEL’S INDISCRIMINATE ATTACKS IN LEBANON:  ATTACKS ON FLEEING 
CIVILIANS (2006), http://hrw.org/reports/2006/lebanon0806/5.htm#_Toc14229922 
3 (characterizing attacks in which Israeli forces knew civilians were present as “at 
best, . . . reckless” and “at worst,” deliberate).  However, some scholars argue that 
making such a determination is not even desirable.  Bagaric and Morss posit that 
“[t]he central flaw of [the doctrine of] double effect is the impossibility of creating a 
model capable of distinguishing between what is intended and what is merely 
foreseen which applies to all circumstances.”  Bagaric & Morss, supra note 71, at 175. 
 170. See supra note 168 and accompanying text (questioning whether the goal of 
eradicating terrorism justifies collateral injury to innocent civilians and noting that 
the concepts of proportionality and noncombatant immunity do not always provide 
clear answers). 
 171. See DINSTEIN, supra note 78, at 240 (proclaiming that when facing a non-
isolated attack from another state, “despite the condition of proportionality, a war of 
self-defense may be carried out until it brings about the complete collapse of the 
enemy belligerent”). 
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Effect (“DDE”)172—which balances parties’ interests in defense and 
civilian immunity, while accounting for actors’ motives—as a means 
of performing the calculus necessary to determine when unintended, 
but foreseeable, civilian casualties are morally justified in the context 
of a self-defense action.173 
The DDE was originally applied to warfare between different 
kingdoms during the Middle Ages and then later was adapted for use 
in conflicts between states.174  The bulk of violent conflicts today, 
however, no longer occur between two states, but instead occur 
between non-state actors and states.175  This, inter alia, explains why 
current reflections of jus in bello principles in international law no 
longer provide adequate guidance to states.176  Specifically, 
disagreements have arisen regarding whether civilians located near 
non-state aggressors should have absolute immunity from a state 
response in self-defense.177 
                                                          
 172. See STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA, War, supra note 26 (distilling Aquinas’s concept 
of the DDE into a mathematical formula).  A classic statement of the DDE is that if 
an actor (“X”) considers an attack (“T”), which the actor believes will produce both 
good effects (“J”) and bad effects (“U”), “[t]he DDE permits X to perform T only if: 
1) T is otherwise permissible; 2) X only intends J and not U; 3) U is not a means to J; 
and 4) the goodness of J is worth, or is proportionately greater than, the badness of 
U.”  Id. 
 173. See WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS, supra note 23, at 153 (listing the four 
classical conditions under which an act likely to have “evil consequences” is still 
permissible:  (1) the act must be a “legitimate act of war”; (2) the direct effect, such 
as destroying military equipment, must be “morally acceptable”; (3) the actor must 
aim only for the “acceptable effect”; and (4) the “good effect” must be good enough 
to “compensate for allowing the evil effect”). 
 174. See id. at 152–55 (adapting the DDE from its development by “Catholic 
casuists in the Middle Ages” for use to analyze the bombardment of Korea, and 
concluding that in modern conflict a third condition should be added, requiring 
that “[t]he intention of the actor is good . . . the evil effect is not one of [the 
military’s] ends, . . . and . . . the military seeks to minimize [the evil involved], 
accepting costs to [it]self”). 
 175. See CAIRNS, supra note 1, at 5–6 (stating that there has been a “blurring of the 
definition of what is a fighting force”); Swiney, supra note 13, at 743 (concluding that 
in light of conflicts in Colombia, Israel, Iraq, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Chechnya, and 
other locations that “modern warfare is becoming asymmetrical”). 
 176. See Guruli, supra note 13, at 122–23 (quoting George W. Bush’s proclamation 
that “[t]he meaning of ‘armed attack’ may have appeared self explanatory to the 
drafters of the U.N. Charter . . . however, the world has witnessed the rise of a new 
and perhaps more sinister form of warfare”).  See generally JEREMY BLACK, WAR AND THE 
NEW DISORDER IN THE 21ST CENTURY 26–118 (2004) (cataloguing the variety of new 
influences that are changing the dimensions of armed conflicts). 
 177. Compare Bagaric & Morss, supra note 71, at 176 (arguing that international 
law should be reformed so “there is no room for excuses under the guise of [the 
DDE]” and that “[t]here should be a zero tolerance policy to killing civilians”), with 
Gross, Thwarting Terrorist Acts, supra note 14, at 234 (“[O]n occasion, [civilian 
populations near terrorists] may be harmed as a result of being adjacent to the 
battleground.  In such a case, there is no need to stop the fighting; however a certain 
amount of caution must be exercised . . . .”).  See generally WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST 
WARS, supra note 23, at 156 (recognizing that subsequent to the determination that 
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C. Ascertaining When the Use of Force is Justified 
A major principle regarding war that has been embraced 
throughout recent history is that acts of aggression are both morally 
wrong and illegal.178  Generally, aggression is defined by the “use of 
armed force . . . against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or 
political independence of another State.”179  Once the line has been 
crossed and an aggressive act has been committed, a forceful 
response is justified.180 
Acts of aggression force states to choose whether certain rights 
(e.g., sovereignty, security) are worth dying to protect.181  If one actor 
aggresses, the other one must then choose to either fight the war to 
the extent necessary to protect its interests, or allow an intrusion 
upon its rights.182  Because actors should not be forced into this 
dilemma, the law frequently considers instigators culpable not only 
for their own acts, but also potentially for damage ensuing indirectly 
from their acts.183  Many popular political philosophies also embrace 
this model of attributing culpability and responsibility.184 
                                                          
the use of force is morally acceptable, “due care” is still required to ensure that the 
attack is carried out within the boundaries that originally made it acceptable). 
 178. Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314, Annex, U.N. GOAR, 29th Sess., 
Supp. No. 31, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (Dec. 14, 1974); WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS, 
supra note 23, at 51 (proclaiming that aggression is a crime against states, and that 
fighting aggression is often the “morally preferred response”). 
 179. G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 178, art. 1; see DINSTEIN, supra note 78, at 125 
(noticing that the General Assembly’s Definition of Aggression only defines 
aggression “in a generic way”). 
 180. This statement is an expression of jus ad bellum principles (albeit a simplified 
one), but this point is important to the extent that aggression can be defined not 
only by acts committed, but also by the fact that it necessitates a forceful response.  
See, e.g., WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS, supra note 23, at 52 (“Aggression opens the 
gates of hell.”).  But see DINSTEIN, supra note 78, at 125 (arguing that the drafters of 
the Definition of Aggression were trying to convey the notion that “not every act of 
aggression constitutes a crime”). 
 181. See WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS, supra note 23, at 52–53 (declaring that a 
state that chooses to “resist, whose soldiers risk their lives and die, does so because its 
leaders and people think that they should or that they have to fight back”). 
 182. Cf. DINSTEIN, supra note 78, at 120 (relaying the judgment of the 
International Military Tribunal in the Nuremberg trial, which held that “initiat[ing] 
a ‘war of aggression’” is the “supreme international crime” because it embodies the 
“accumulated evil” of the entire ensuing war). 
 183. See Beres, supra note 32, at 148–49 (attributing legal responsibility for the 
deaths of civilians to “those whose perfidious conduct brought about [the self-
defense action]”); cf. Hart & Honore, supra note 105, at 179–80 (describing the 
importance of tracing the foreseeable consequences of events in attributing 
responsibility in the criminal law context). 
 184. See, e.g., JOHN KEKES, A CASE FOR CONSERVATISM 70–71 (1998) (arguing that 
from a “conservative” perspective, an initial infliction of harm is “evil,” but that 
infliction of harm in response to the initial evil is not itself evil where that harm is a 
“deserved punishment” or was “the predictable consequence” of the initial evil).  
Christian Just War Theory also endorses this approach because harm brought by an 
unjust attack renders the attacker deserving of punishment, and thus justifies a war 
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The U.N. Charter’s general prohibition on the use of force185 is 
tempered by Article 51, which states, “[n]othing in the present 
Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defense186 if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
Nations . . . .”187  In order to reach the question of what responses to 
an attacker who uses human shields should be available, it is first 
necessary to assume, arguendo, that the attacks discussed herein form 
a legal and moral basis for a state to respond with some kind of 
force.188  When there is an agreement that an aggressive act was 
wrong, and that a response is justified, it would make little sense for 
international law to restrict the only potential means of prevailing.189 
                                                          
against that attacker.  See COLM MCKEOGH, INNOCENT CIVILIANS 53–54 (2002) (citing 
Aquinas’s goal of preventing “wickedness”).  Aquinas’s writings also overlap with 
utilitarian theory because he argues that war is justified when it serves the greater 
good.  Id.  Augustine, another prominent early Christian Just War theorist, avoided 
this proposition.  Id. 
 185. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of 
the United Nations.”). 
 186. The right to self-defense is codified in treaty law by Article 51 of the U.N. 
Charter; in customary international law, the right is grounded in determinations of a 
state’s necessity.  See Gross, Thwarting Terrorist Acts, supra note 14, at 210–13.  This 
Comment does not pass judgment on which approach is more appropriate, but it is 
important to understand that certain self-defense measures, such as anticipatory self-
defense or “targeted killings” can be justified by customary international law, while 
being prohibited by treaty law.  Id. at 210–12.  Further, many scholars believe that 
since aggression is a crime against international law, states besides the one aggressed 
upon are justified in enforcing international law against the aggressor.  See, e.g., 
WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS, supra note 23, at 61–63 (“Anyone, [even those not 
directly attacked], can come to the aid of a victim [and] use necessary force against 
an aggressor.”). 
 187. U.N. Charter art. 51.  Despite controversy about whether the “armed attack” 
requirement is met by a non-state actor, these provisions are an expression of jus ad 
bellum principles because they declare when a forceful military response is justified.  
JOHNSON, MORALITY, supra note 14, at 24 tbl.1; see Guruli supra note 13, at 104–05 
(noting how in Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 
(June 27), the International Court of Justice has interpreted the “armed attack” 
requirement of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter as requiring some form of state action 
whereas the United States and Israel have consistently asserted that a terrorist attack, 
with or without state support, is an “armed attack” under that provision); Kendall, 
supra note 13, at 1078–80 (observing that interpretations of Article 51’s “armed 
attack requirement” can be classified into two major categories:  “liberal” and 
“restrictive”). 
 188. Most theorists agree that aggression is one of the only (if not the only) 
justified bases for a self-defense military action; thus, aggression is “the crime of war.”  
See, e.g., WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS, supra note 23, at 51, 62 (“Nothing [but 
aggression] warrants the use of force in international society—above all, not any 
difference of religion or politics.”).  However, not every illegal act against a state is an 
act of aggression.  Id. at 62.  And of course, not every actor who fails to separate 
military and civilian targets is an aggressor. 
 189. See Gross, Human Shields, supra note 7, at 508 (“[E]ven on the path to 
compromise and settlement, if the state is faced with clear danger to the lives of its 
citizens, it must continue to protect them by the necessary means.”) (emphasis 
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IV. A PROPOSAL FOR NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW 
A. Incorporating the Lessons of the Domestic Analogies  
into International Law 
Since international law is the framework for analyzing the use of 
military force against human shield tactics, the consistency of 
international law with its own aims is essential to the preservation of 
just laws.190  As explained, current international law can be interpreted 
to reach conclusions similar to those of criminal law and tort law.191  
Unfortunately, it can also be interpreted to reach ones that are very 
different.192  The following principles would help to clarify parties’ 
responsibilities and culpability in a human shield scenario: 
I. Acts of aggression performed by non-state actors justify a military 
response in the same manner that state acts of aggression do.193 
II. Where a military action in self-defense is justified by an act of 
aggression, the defending actor is not culpable for incidental 
damages following from the self-defense action to the extent that 
a.  those damages are within the risk created by the aggressor’s 
prior violation of the duty to separate its military targets from 
the civilian population;194 and 
b.  the self-defense action is reasonably likely to be effective in 
its goal of preventing harm;195 and 
c.  the incidental damages were not intended;196 and 
                                                          
added); Sofaer, supra note 2, at 91 (“Narrow views of self-defense give terrorists and 
their state sponsors substantial advantages in their war against . . . democracies.”). 
 190. See Jones, supra note 49, at 252 (proclaiming that inconsistency and 
incoherence in international law “significantly erodes well-established legal 
principles of distinction”); supra notes 50–52 (explaining that international law 
influences policy and has importance beyond its application in courts and tribunals). 
 191. See supra Part II (demonstrating that application of the distinctions between 
acceptable and unacceptable behavior as prescribed under criminal and tort law can 
lead to just results in the international law context). 
 192. See supra Part I.B (explaining the potential advantages that exist under 
current international law for aggressors who utilize human shields). 
 193. Provision I is intended to make it clear that both state and non-state acts of 
aggression satisfy the armed attack requirement of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. 
 194. See supra notes 85–87 and accompanying text (explaining the use of the 
“harm within the risk” test in domestic criminal law); infra notes 212–220 and 
accompanying text (justifying the use of the “harm within the risk” test for armed 
conflicts). 
 195. The provisions of II(b)–(d) are intended to embody an updated version of 
the principle of proportionality that can provide more practical guidance in a 
human shield scenario than current laws.  See supra Part III (discussing the principles 
of just war theory as embodied in current international law). 
 196. Provision II(c) also reflects the principle of distinction.  See supra notes 168–
171 and accompanying text (addressing problems with the principle of distinction as 
embodied in current international law).  None of the challenges presented by 
human shield tactics can or should justify a reprisal where the specific goal is to 
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d.  the self-defense actions are designed to cause as little 
incidental damage as possible without making an effective 
defense from aggression impossible.197 
B. Why a Domestic Analogy Is Justified 
The laws presented above do not reflect completely new principles, 
but rather are a clarification and prioritization of existing laws.198  The 
doctrines of distinction and proportionality reflect widely accepted 
notions of just conduct in war that have developed since their 
introduction in the Middle Ages.199  However, for law to be effective, it 
must continually evolve so it can address new factual scenarios.200  
Concepts such as different tests of causation borrowed from criminal 
and tort law and affirmative duties in the use of property borrowed 
from tort law should be utilized in developing new laws regarding 
human shield tactics; these guidelines help preserve the aims of 
international law, while providing a way to bring it up to speed with 
contemporary tactics in war.201 
                                                          
injure civilians.  See MICHAEL WALZER, ARGUING ABOUT WAR 61 (2004) (positing that 
“[t]he refusal to make ordinary people into targets, whatever their nationality or 
even their politics, is the only way to say no to terrorism,” and that self-defense 
actions are “legitimate responses to terrorism only when they are constrained by the 
same moral principles that rule out terrorism itself”). 
 197. Provision II(d) aims at updating the principle of proportionality to safeguard 
the right of self-defense from being preempted or compromised by the use of 
perfidious or otherwise illegal tactics.  See supra Part I.A (demonstrating how 
perfidious tactics can prevent otherwise legitimate actions from complying with 
Articles 51 and 52 of Protocol I); infra Part IV.D (explaining the legal and moral 
significance of a failure to obey the dictates of Articles 37 and 58 of Protocol I). 
 198. See supra Parts I.B & III (outlining existing law under the U.N. Charter, 
Geneva Convention, and Protocol I). 
 199. See Swiney, supra note 13, at 733 (stating that the “Principle of Distinction is 
widely accepted and constitutes the core doctrine of the law of war”).  But see supra 
notes 175–177 and accompanying text (arguing the changing nature of conflict and 
use of human shields in warfare require revisions to the principle of distinction as 
embodied in existing international law). 
 200. This truism stands regardless of whether one seeks a reform that empowers 
large and powerful state actors or smaller non-state ones.  See Guruli, supra note 13, 
at 122–23 (suggesting that because of the increasing frequency of new tactics and 
terrorist attacks, “the international community faces the inevitable challenge of 
redefining its legal standards on use of force in self-defense”); Swiney, supra note 13, 
at 736 (attempting to align the principle of distinction with “the realities of 
asymmetrical warfare”). 
 201. See WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS, supra note 23, at 54 (advancing the theory 
that since states’ rights are just a reflection of individuals’ collective rights, it “makes 
sense to say that territorial integrity and political sovereignty can be defended in 
exactly the same way as individual life and liberty”).  But see supra note 78 (relaying 
some common objections to the domestic analogy). 
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The decision to incorporate two concepts from domestic law is 
justified because their aims are similar to that of international law.202  
The “harm within the risk” test is appropriate to apply in this 
situation because, just like the principle of distinction, it is intended 
to provide protection to bystanders.203  And the duty to use property 
only so as not to create an unreasonable risk of damage to others’ 
property is designed as a means of protecting the rights of parties 
who have little or no relation to the actions that are causing injury.204  
Similarly, the duty to place military personnel and facilities away from 
civilians is meant to protect those who are not involved with the 
fighting.205  Admittedly, there are some different considerations in the 
international context, such as the difference in purposes between 
police and military, but the goals sought by these domestic principles 
and the corresponding international law are similar.206 
Further, the domestic law discussed in this Comment is largely 
rooted in philosophical bases that recognize the right of freedom 
from aggression and the importance of autonomy.207  Unsurprisingly, 
analogous notions of justice motivate international law.208  So 
domestic and international law have comparable goals and 
                                                          
 202. See supra notes 76–77, 111 and accompanying text (arguing the distinctions 
between acceptable and unacceptable behavior that are outlined in criminal and tort 
law are readily applicable to the use of human shields in armed conflict). 
 203. See JOHNSON, MODERN WAR, supra note 155, at 27–28 (tracing the idea of non-
combatant immunity back to the Middle Ages and explaining its continually evolving 
moral significance); Heidi M. Hurd & Michael S. Moore, Negligence in the Air, 3 
THEORETICAL INQ. L. 333, 348 (2002) (noting that under some  justifications of the 
“harm within the risk” test “a victim’s rights . . . are rights against being placed at risk 
of harm”). 
 204. See, e.g., Henry T. Terry, Negligence, 29 HARV. L. REV. 40, 44 (1915) (stating 
that the law protects certain interests, including “human life and bodily safety, the 
safety of property,” and “pecuniary condition”). 
 205. See, e.g., JOHNSON, MORALITY, supra note 14, at 36 (advancing the widely-
accepted notion that the Geneva Conventions and Protocols Additional give legal 
effect to the moral requirements of proportionality and discrimination). 
 206. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 cmt. b (1965) (stating that, 
broadly speaking, negligence law strives to protect recognized interests from being 
intruded upon), with Protocol I, supra note 11, pmbl. (affirming the provision’s 
purpose as further enforcing states’ duty to avoid intruding upon other states’ 
recognized interests in “sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence”). 
 207. See HYMAN GROSS, THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 169, at 13 (positing 
that criminal law is designed to protect from harm inflicted by others, such as 
murder or assault and battery, because society has come to a consensus on the “right 
to be free of such harm”); Keating, supra note 111, at 23 (viewing tort law as 
protecting the freedom from injury and death caused by others’ actions, while still 
allowing citizens to freely pursue personal goals to the extent that their actions do 
not infringe upon others’ rights). 
 208. See Bagaric & Morss, supra note 71, at 205–06 (advocating for the further 
development of international criminal law because criminal law is “concerned with 
safeguarding the most important human interests”); supra notes 108, 132 (discussing 
the connection between the domestic enforcement of rights on an individual level 
and international enforcement of similar rights in the global arena). 
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motivations, but somewhat different methods for trying to protect the 
right to be free from harms thrust upon people not willfully involved 
in the damage-causing scenario.209  Since international law is pursuing 
comparable goals to domestic law, contrasting and combining the 
methods employed in each context is one productive way to address 
shortcomings in international law that have resulted from the 
emergence of new tactics.210 
C. Causation’s Role in Justly Distributing Culpability for Civilian Deaths 
International law, at least on its face, analyzes causation in fashion 
that can result in both parties being culpable for a given harm to 
civilians, notwithstanding the fact that the human shield tactics were 
responsible for the civilians being in harms’ way initially.211  Using a 
“harm within the risk” approach to human shield tactics would more 
effectively embody the goal of distinction, which is to protect 
unarmed civilians within the context of a war waged with a just 
cause.212  Belligerents use the human shield tactic because it is a 
successful means to gain advantages militarily and in the court of 
public opinion.213  A “harm within the risk” test to determine 
                                                          
 209. Some of the differences include tests of causation, consideration of 
individual incidents in isolation instead of in a larger context, and different means of 
imposing duties upon actors.  See supra Part II (setting forth analogies between 
domestic criminal and tort law and international law regarding human shield 
situations).  This statement does not refer to enforcement mechanisms in 
international and domestic law, which necessarily differ due to states’ sovereignty 
and their practicality in different contexts.  See Austin & Kolenc, supra note 48, at 313 
(“[G]lobal courts such as the International Court of Justice . . . have little 
enforcement power.  Domestic U.S. courts . . . posses the jurisdiction and power to 
carry out their decisions . . . .”); Bagaric & Morss, supra note 71, at 205 (conceding 
that in some circumstances, international law must be subordinate to domestic law to 
avoid issues such as double jeopardy).  Austin and Kolenc also suggest that states, 
such as the United States, are more likely to yield some sovereignty to a court with 
definite limits on its jurisdiction than a court like the ICC, which has a broad view of 
its own jurisdiction.  Austin & Kolenc, supra note 48, at 312–13. 
210. See Dershowitz, supra note 4 (using a domestic analogy to explore the 
application of international law).  
 211. See Henckaerts & Doswal-Beck, supra note 114, at 498-99 (noting that 
international humanitarian legal obligations are not dependent upon reciprocity).  
This is not to quarrel with the all parties’ to a conflict obligations to obey the law, but 
rather to point out that human shield tactics may impair the defending party’s ability 
to comply with international law because they make the determination of whether an 
area is a legal military target more difficult.  See supra notes 41-46 (discussing a 
controversy over the legality of an Israeli invasion of Palestinian village where attacks 
had  emanated from).      
 212. See ELSHTAIN, supra note 152, at 20 (stressing the moral significance of 
deliberately targeting civilians and positing that if the world cannot distinguish 
between killings intended to sow terror and those made while attempting to battle 
such tactics, “we live in a world of moral nihilism”). 
 213. Dershowitz, supra note 4; see Kieval, supra note 22, at 890–91 (describing how 
Israel’s decision to “not fire[] indiscriminately” and use ground forces instead of 
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culpability in such situations would have two large implications that 
should, in the long run, reduce civilian casualties.214 
First, placing blame with the party that made harm to civilians 
likely ensures the legitimacy of reasonably proportional attacks on 
belligerents who use human shield tactics, instead of leaving that 
determination open to widely varied interpretations.215  This gives 
combatants who attempt to respect international law more latitude to 
target actors who use human shields and frees those actors from 
cumbersome and potentially arbitrary determinations of whether 
their actions will be accepted by the international community.216  This 
development would then deprive human shield users of one of the 
tactic’s biggest strategic advantages:  the ability to attack where a 
counter-attack is of questionable legality, and therefore less likely to 
occur.217  
Second, a “harm within the risk” standard for determining 
culpability in a human shield scenario would help reduce the use of 
perfidious tactics without necessarily creating a greater risk of harm 
to civilians because the principles of distinction and proportionality 
remain intact, though updated.218  Combatants would still not be 
                                                          
airplanes because the enemy had chosen to hide among civilians led to twenty-three 
soldiers’ deaths); Reynolds, supra note 9, at 78 (“Principles of decency, morality, and 
humanity reflected in [the Laws of Armed Conflict] to protect the civilian 
population present attractive centers of gravity to exploit where concealment warfare 
is effectively employed.”). 
 214. See infra notes 215–223 and accompanying text (explaining the applicability 
of the “harm within the risk” analysis to the principles of proportionality and 
distinction and the DDE to ensure blame is placed on the appropriate party and 
perfidious tactics are punished). 
 215. See Kieval, supra note 22, at 897–98 (arguing that creating rules that no 
parties will obey in times of danger only serves to erode the legitimacy of 
international law, and that “if international legal criticism is meant to affect 
incentives, it must leave a path for the targeted [s]tate to take without failing to 
protect its citizens”). 
 216. See Jones, supra note 49, at 252 (asserting that because of international law’s 
lack of coherence, which leads to unfair condemnations, “Protocol I . . . not only 
impedes an occupying army’s ability to protect peaceful civilians, but it also removes 
incentives for occupying forces to properly weigh the humanitarian objectives of 
[international law] against the necessity of military attacks”). 
 217. Gross, Human Shields, supra note 7, at 447 (believing that actors who use 
human shields “act on the assumption that a democratic state fighting in accordance 
with the law of war will refrain from causing harm to those civilians and, 
consequently, will also refrain from causing harm to the [belligerents who use 
human shields]”).  International law does declare human tactics illegal.  See 
HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 114,  at 337-40 (discussing various forms 
the prohibition on using human shields takes in international law); supra note 32 
(explaining the prohibition on using human shields).  However, the proposed law 
goes further than current international laws by directly and explicitly linking the 
specific risk posed by a given use of human shields to the resulting harm suffered by 
civilians.    
 218. The “harm within the risk” test would, in some circumstances, legitimize 
actions of states that attempt to abide by the basic moral principles embodied in 
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allowed to strike indiscriminately because the actors using human 
shields did not expose the civilians to the risk that they would be 
harmed by a careless (and thus morally unacceptable) attack.219  
However, when deciding whether an attack was proportional to the 
advantage gained, the new law incorporates the value of ending 
perfidious tactics into the DDE calculus.220 
This adjustment is proper because the goal of the DDE is to assess 
when incidental damage is morally permissible.221  Since the 
persistent use of human shield tactics presents such a large threat of 
harm to civilians, a higher level of incidental damage (when 
unavoidable, of course) is justified when a state is combating the 
ongoing use of such tactics.222  In other words, the “harm within the 
                                                          
international law.  See supra notes 53–72 and accompanying text (describing the 
condemnation from international courts and non-government organizations even 
when states attempt to obey the principles of distinction and proportionality).  
Indiscriminate military actions will still be condemned, but the new laws create a 
common legal framework from which to issue such condemnations, so that necessary 
criticisms of immoral acts will also carry more weight.  See Robert J. Beck & Anthony 
Clark Arend, “Don’t Tread on Us”:  International Law and Forcible State Responses to 
Terrorism, 12 WIS. INT’L L.J. 153, 191–93 (1994) (observing that while many Israeli and 
U.S. military actions have been widely criticized for causing collateral damage, even 
the condemnations of the U.N. Security Council lack the consistency and legal 
sophistication necessary to be considered impartial and authoritative). 
 219. See Gross, Human Shields, supra note 7, at 487–88 (recognizing that the only 
harm to civilians that is morally acceptable according to the DDE is harm that is a 
“by-product” of an attack where incidental damage is limited “to the greatest extent 
possible”).  The public perception of military actions taken against those using 
concealment warfare is important to all parties in a conflict.  Given this reality, the 
laws proposed give groups analyzing military actions a common framework based 
both upon just war theory and the realities of concealment warfare.  See Reynolds, 
supra note 9, at 106 (expressing hope that, when properly educated, humanitarian 
groups and the media can “provide[] a counter-measure to disinformation and 
deception, and ensure[] state responsibility”). 
 220. The DDE already considers the military advantage to be gained from a 
specific action, but the proposed laws give a legal (and not just moral) impetus for 
accounting for the good achieved by rooting out users of human shield tactics.  See 
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA, War, supra note 26 (noting the DDE’s requirement that the 
good accomplished must be worth the foreseeable, negative result); supra notes 172–
177 and accompanying text (finding only a vague connection between current 
international law and the DDE).  Using the formula expressed in note 172, the 
positive value of stopping perfidious tactics would be included in the determination 
of whether the attack was justified. See supra note 172. 
 221. See supra notes 172–174 and accompanying text (describing the historic use 
of the DDE in applying the principles of distinction and proportionality to conflicts 
between states). 
 222. See Beres, supra note 32, at 150–52 (arguing that if Israel were to give in to 
perfidious tactics, the victory won by aggressors would open the door for even more 
civilian casualties); Anderson, supra note 141, at 43 (articulating concern that the 
status quo rewards weaker actors’ “systematic violations of the law” by forcing all the 
burdens of conducting a just war to the actor with superior technology and 
manpower, and that such a system “is unsustainable as a basis for the law of war”); cf. 
ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, PREEMPTION:  A KNIFE THAT CUTS BOTH WAYS 185 (2006) 
(questioning the effectiveness of the human rights movement in ending military 
threats). 
 2007] HUMAN SHIELDS, HOMICIDES, AND HOUSE FIRES 517 
risk” test respects the traditional principles of proportionality and 
distinction, while strengthening the means available to combat the 
use of perfidious tactics.223 
D. The Importance of Prioritizing Actors’ Duties 
The international law proposed in this Comment brings 
combatants’ affirmative duty to avoid placing military targets near 
civilians to the forefront of legal analysis in a human shield 
situation.224  A failure to observe the duty to keep military targets 
separate from the civilian population is often analyzed apart from 
attacks against actors that violate their duty.225 
Keeping these analyses separate makes little sense because of the 
clear connection between the violation of the duty to isolate military 
targets and the determination of whether an attack on such targets 
met the requirements of discrimination and proportionality.226  Actors 
are provided with little guidance on how to conduct themselves in the 
future when both parties are considered culpable but those 
determinations are made separately.  By mandating joint 
considerations of one party’s culpability for using human shields and 
the proportionality of the opposing party’s attack, each party’s 
                                                          
 223. Unfortunately, current international law as applied to human shield 
situations has failed to achieve success in both preventing civilian deaths and in 
deterring the use of perfidious tactics.  See Jones, supra note 49, at 296–97 (asserting 
that many civilian deaths during Operation Iraqi Freedom occurred not because of 
any “refusal to obey” Protocol I, but because Protocol I’s “contradictory construct” 
allows for a “weakening of distinction requirements in favor of insurgents”; this, in 
turn, discouraged the occupying military from valuing proportionality over the 
“demands of military necessity”). 
 224. See supra Part IV.A (proposing that one of the factors in determining whether 
the defending actor is culpable for incidental damage to its military action in self-
defense is whether the resulting damages are within the risk of the aggressor’s 
violation of the duty to separate its military targets from the civilian population). 
 225. See, e.g., AMNESTY INT’L, ISRAEL/LEBANON:  OUT OF ALL PROPORTION—CIVILIANS 
BEAR THE BRUNT OF THE WAR (2006),  http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGM 
DE020332006?open&of=ENG-ISR (failing to list Article 58 of Protocol I as applicable 
law and decrying many actions of the Israeli Defense Force as disproportionate 
without seriously considering the military advantage to be gained—a necessary 
component of the determination of proportionality); see also supra notes 53–65 and 
accompanying text (arguing, inter alia, that this isolated analysis unduly criticizes the 
justified actions of an attacker while undermining the attacker’s right to self-
defense). 
 226. A determination of the proportionality of an attack requires knowledge of 
the ends sought by the party accused of performing a disproportionate attack.  See 
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA, War, supra note 26 (defining the jus in bello principle).  
However, if the threat posed by the party using human shields is not evaluated along 
with the allegedly disproportionate attack, then accurately gauging the military 
advantage to be gained becomes difficult.  See supra Part III.B (explaining the 
difficulty of analyzing fault under the existing provisions of Articles 51, 52(2), and 58 
in the human shield context). 
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culpability can more effectively be determined relative to the 
other’s.227  Obviously, it would be best that no civilian deaths occur, 
but the realities of warfare make that unlikely.228  So where both 
parties to a conflict might be declared responsible for the loss of 
innocent lives, actions that are most justifiable in light of the aims of 
protecting innocent lives and preserving sovereignty should be 
encouraged over acts that serve those purposes less—or not at all.229 
Therefore, the law proposed in this Comment distributes 
culpability in an attack against human shield actors so that the goal of 
combating perfidious tactics justifies some incidental damage, and so 
those tactics do not render an otherwise permissible self-defense 
action illegal.230  In other words, an aggressor’s deliberate failure to 
abide by the duty to separate military targets from civilians is a greater 
evil than a certain amount of incidental damage from a self-defense 
action because a justified self-defense measure at least has acceptable 
aims, whereas the use of human shields does not.231  Of course, if the 
incidental damage was reasonably avoidable, the self-defense action 
becomes the greater evil because the same goal could have been 
                                                          
 227. See supra notes 103–109 (describing how a “harm within the risk” test is an 
effective tool for determining culpability where one party’s illegal behavior created a 
likelihood that another party would harm innocent people).  Compare supra Part IV.A 
(proposed law providing for dual culpability analysis), with supra notes 53–65, 225 
and accompanying text (explaining the faults of non-reciprocal culpability analysis).   
 228. See Bruderlein, supra note 31, at 221 (lamenting the “limited ability of the 
international community” to respond effectively to “major humanitarian crises” 
despite many states’ “renewed commitment . . . to abide by the rules of international 
humanitarian law”). 
 229. See ELSHTAIN, supra note 152, at 19–20 (stressing the need to distinguish 
between civilian deaths caused accidentally in the course of war and those caused 
intentionally). 
 230. Professor Emanuel Gross posits that when the duty to avoid harming the 
innocent is at tension with the duty to protect citizens of the state, the first duty may 
be breached, “even though we are aware our activities will lead to the death of 
innocents who are located in the vicinity of the [enemy].”  Gross, Human Shields, 
supra note 7, at 483–84.  However, states are still bound by rules of proportionality, 
and absent “exceptional circumstances,” states still have a moral duty to refrain from 
killing civilians.  See id. 
 231. See ELSHTAIN, supra note 152, at 19–20 (analogizing the failure to distinguish 
between intentional harm to combatants and injury to peaceful civilians to the 
failure to distinguish between murder and accidental death).  Further, certain acts, 
such as using weapons that cannot be controlled or disguising combatants as 
supposedly immune personnel (e.g., U.N. observers), are violations of international 
law because they are considered mala in se, or “evil in themselves.”  STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA, War, supra note 26.  Like the tactics considered mala in se in 
international law, the intentional use of human shields can only make conflict more 
hazardous to civilians and belligerents.  See Swiney, supra note 13, at 743 (“With 
urban fighting a reality and insurgents who are often indistinguishable from civilians, 
the temptation for American forces to ignore Distinction might be high. . . . Iraq 
provides a snapshot of how Distinction is practiced and how it is preached.”). 
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accomplished without violating the principles of distinction and 
proportionality.232 
Further, when states perform a self-defense action against human 
shield actors, humanitarian groups, the media, and other members of 
the international community would have a legal impetus to more 
closely scrutinize both actors’ conduct, and not just the actor whose 
weapon physically caused the collateral damage.233  This approach 
should in turn reduce the ability of perfidious actors to pervert the 
international law to generate favor in the court of public opinion.234  
Also, since each actor’s conduct would be considered relative to the 
other’s, it will be easier to asses whether specific measures were 
proportional to the advantage gained.235 
E. Closing Loopholes 
Finally, the laws proposed in this Comment close loopholes in 
international law that could be exploited by belligerents using human 
shield tactics.236  Specifically, the new laws eliminate controversy 
regarding whether an attack by a non-state actor satisfies the “armed 
attack” requirement of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.237  This 
approach is necessary because a failure to hold non-state actors 
culpable for perfidious acts ends up being a grant of immunity from 
                                                          
 232. See supra Parts III.B, IV.A (outlining the principles of distinction and 
proportionality as embodied in current law and prosing new law to account for the 
use of human shields in armed conflict). 
 233. See Warren Hoge, Attacks Qualify as War Crimes, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, July 
20, 2006, at A-6 (reporting Louise Arbour, chief prosecutor for the International 
Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, as questioning the legality 
of rocket attacks between Hezbollah and Israel without simultaneously considering 
culpability for performing military operations in a civilian area); supra Part IV.A 
(proposing a modification of international law that requires analysis of both parties’ 
actions to determine culpability rather than immediate assignment of blame to the 
attacker). 
 234. “The combination of expanded media access, greater disclosure of military 
activities, and increased presence of humanitarian interest groups in the battle space 
translates into an improved level of influence over domestic and international 
opinion by these groups.”  Reynolds, supra note 9, at 103.  Reynolds persuasively 
suggests that to enable these outlets to portray conflicts fairly (and to evaluate their 
own behavior), states whose attacks result in incidental damage should impartially 
investigate those attacks, which would counteract perfidious actors’ reporting of 
distorted versions of the facts or law.  Id. at 104. 
 235. See supra notes 53–65, 225 and accompanying text (describing the negative 
consequences of one-sided analysis). 
 236. See supra Part IV.A (proposing international law that emphasizes the duty of 
combatants to separate themselves from civilian populations); cf. Jones, supra note 
49, at 297 (“There must be a clear prohibition under [international law] against any 
conduct that impedes or compromises an occupying force’s ability to distinguish 
insurgents from peaceful civilians so as to preserve innocent lives.”).  
 237. Supra Part IV.A (legitimizing a military response to both state and non-state 
acts of aggression). 
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military response.238  International law cannot achieve goals such as 
defending state sovereignty and protecting innocent lives if the 
conduct of a significant portion of the actors in modern conflict is 
not universally seen to trigger the protections available to states 
under international law.239  
This approach is also justified because the language of the U.N. 
Charter, and Protocol I simply reflect that states were the dominant 
institutions in international conflict at the time those documents 
were conceived.240  The right to be free from aggression should not be 
exclusively enforced against state actors because it is the aggression 
that is wrong, and that wrongness is not predicated on what type of 
actor commits the aggression.241  Saddling the right to self-defense 
against aggression with a requirement that the aggressor be a state 
actor ignores the purpose of that right in the first place.242  
                                                          
 238. See Murphy, supra note 77, at 51 (“Today our appreciation of . . . non-
traditional means of engaging in an armed attack must also comprehend the 
pernicious methods of terrorist organizations.”); Travalio, supra note 1, at 166 
(observing that traditional interpretations of the requirements for self-defense are 
“too restrictive to reasonably respond to the threat posed by international 
terrorism”). 
 239. This is not meant to suggest that courts will necessarily hold non-state actors 
accountable.  However, self-help and collective remedies by states should be 
allowable regardless of who infringes upon the state’s rights.  See Guruli, supra note 
13, at 123 (arguing that for international law to be legitimate and consistent “it is 
essential that certain terrorist acts be included in the definition of armed attack”). 
 240. See JOHNSON, MORALITY, supra note 14, at 58–61 (arguing that because the 
United Nations’ authority and effectiveness necessarily relies on agreements between 
and actions of sovereign member states, the charter was written in state-centric 
language).  The Geneva Convention and Protocol I’s language are directed at 
“states,” evidencing the drafters focus on state-actors over non-state actors.  Protocol 
I, supra note 11.  
 241. Id. at 27–31 (equating Walzer’s “theory of aggression” with the concept of 
“just cause” for war, and arguing that legal requirements, such as the armed attack 
requirement, were intended to make sure that only sovereigns with proper authority 
undertook a defensive war). 
 242. See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 114, at 497 (reporting that non-
States are required to follow the rules of international humanitarian law and that 
some international laws reflect this requirement by referring to “parties to the 
conflict” instead of states); WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS, supra note 23, at 59 
(recognizing that regardless of whether there is state action, when the “victim of 
aggression fights in self-defense” against aggression, the victim is defending against 
and punishing the aggressor in order to maintain rights and deter future aggressors); 
see also Guruli, supra note 13, at 105 (explaining that despite the lack of a “conclusive 
authority” stating that a terrorist attack is an armed attack, the United States and 
Israel have argued that a military response to such attacks is implicitly recognized in 
the Charter’s right of self-defense); Sofaer, supra note 2, at 122–23 (questioning why 
anyone would support law that limited “a nation’s right to defend itself to situations 
in which its territory or political independence is threatened”). 
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CONCLUSION 
If justice is the goal of the laws of armed conflict, then the laws 
must be changed to reflect previously unconsidered scenarios.  
Indeed, “every war is a Petri dish for the next round of the laws of 
war.”243  Human shield tactics make modern conflicts more dangerous 
to civilians.  Since international law does not clearly address the 
human shield issue, states and commentators struggle to interpret 
current law in light of new tactics.  Rather than using outdated law as 
the basis for the analysis of human shield conflicts, this Comment 
argues that new international law should be promulgated to deal with 
this unique and deadly tactic. 
While the right to self-defense is embraced in international law, 
current law can serve to undermine that right in human shield 
situations.  Using tests of causation that explicitly account for all 
relevant factors in determining culpability for civilian deaths ensuing 
from the use of human shield tactics ensures, however, that military 
actions will not be judged in a vacuum.  Rather, military actions will 
be evaluated on their practical necessity, as well as their moral 
justifiability.  The law proposed uses legal standards borrowed from 
domestic law to make the attribution of culpability in a human shield 
situation more just by updating legal interpretations of the traditional 
just war principles of proportionality, distinction, and self-defense to 
account for the proliferation of human shield tactics.   
                                                          
 243. Anderson, supra note 141, at 43. 
